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| Page Type: Article | Page By: chaberton Created/Edited: Sep 9, 2011 / Oct 28, 2011 Object ID: 744872 Hits: 1247  Loading... Page Score: 89.51% - 32 Votes  Loading... Vote: Log in to vote |
The 6th Battery of the 154th Régiment d'Artillerie de Position, "The Destroyer of Chaberton"
In the summer of 1896, Louis Sabattier, journalist and well-known artist of the French magazine "L'Illustration", wrote an article on French and Italian Alpine troops guarding the border at the Col du Montgenèvre.
To do this, he took a coach from Oulx to Cesana, where he spent the night. The day after, he filmed the journey and crossed the border arriving at Briancon.
The writer, in order to better observe the movements of Italian troops, sat next to the coachman armed with a simple notebook and his attentive eyes, he memorized everything he saw along the road. It seemed safer than using binoculars or a camera which could have aroused suspicion. Thanks to his skilled hands he drew very detailed images, better than a photograph.
Louis Sabattier then watched the military exercises of Chasseur Alpin and artillery shots in Briancon. He writes with great details the artillery positions on Mount Janus, a rock-faced pyramid 2500 meters high, located above the village of Montgenèvre. This battery, built at the end of the nineteenth century, made vulnerable and useless the Italian batteries of the Petit Vallon located at a lower altitude.
The author ends his tale by writing about Mount Chaberton, which is also known to him, where the Italians were building a battery located on its peak at 3130 meters. He describes the two fortifications, as two guard dogs, ready to bite at the first command of their master.
In fact, the presence of those Italian guns, placed five hundred meters above the French, made the French artillery completely useless due to their vulnerability. This simple concept was the founding principle of the construction of the Chaberton battery in the late nineteenth century. A single battery was then able to rule alone and capable of reaching all the French positions deployed across the border.
From the beginnings of Chaberton, the French were spying all the phases of construction of the new Italian battery; this was done in order to collect useful information with the sole purpose of finding a method to destroy it.
The tactical advantage of this new battery was similar to a widespread disease in the population of Brianzonnese and its large military garrison. It was rightly called by the French writer, Max Schiavon, "Chabertonite" (Chaberton Pain). It was therefore essential to find the right treatment in the unlikely event that Italy entered in war against France.
The French took very seriously the thorny issue of Chaberton battery. With time, their persistence and vision will offer them a solution.
Attacking and destroying the "Fortress of the clouds", in the early twentieth century, was not a small matter, experts judged that it was nearly impossible to hit the domes with a direct blow.
The protection offered by that bastion of rock was complete. At the time, the French artillery had no “in sight” ballistic weapons sufficiently powerful and accurate to oppose Chaberton.
To temporary appease their cousins across the Alps during the First World War, when the Kingdom of Italy was allied with France and England, the much reviled Chaberton guns were sent to the Eastern front against the Austro-Hungarians.
The political climate changed dramatically with the advent of Fascism in Italy. Mussolini and the threatening discourses such as: "Nice and Savoy must be Italian", did not bode well.
In 1927 the battery was rearmed, little or nothing was done by the Italians to change the early twentieth century structure, the fort continued to be thought of as fully invulnerable. But much had changed; the experiences of World War I had introduced important innovations in mortar trajectories. During the First World War, the French had accumulated an understanding of siege artillery that had yielded excellent results.
The better solution, or "cure", for the Chaberton was proposed in the early thirties by the local command of the 154th Régiment d'Artillerie de Position(R.A.P), based in Grenoble, whom had been given the task of protecting the border in Brianzonnese.
They selected the 280mm mortar “Schneider Creusot Model 1914”, domestically produced. These pieces were originally ordered by the Czar of Russia and sold to various foreign powers such as Japan and Argentina. In thirteen years, four of these mortars had arrived in Briancon, on the orders of Prime Minister Daladier. Their strength, a range of 10,950 meters with a howitzer of 205 kg, represented the ideal solution to the problem of Chaberton.
The option of a 400mm gun on a carriage train or the installation of steel domes with 100mm cannons in the Infernet fort, were soon set aside.
In order to best use the Schneider mortars, you had to solve some problems linked closely to its characteristics. One of the weaknesses of that mortar was the type of installation: it was fixed and the mortar had to be transported by powerful Latil artillery tractors.
They were transported in four pieces: the gun, cradle, trails, and platform. The re-assembly required 6 to 8 hours with twelve engineers. Once assembled the total weight of sixteen tons was fixed. It was essential to find a safe place where the battery had to be completely hidden from sight and enemy fire.
Two areas were considered: the Col du Granon and the Gondran area. Calculating that in order to destroy Chaberton, 700 shots would be needed from the Granon and only 300 shots from the Gondran, the choice fell on the latter.
Two sections of the battery were placed at different heights in the Valley of Cervières, the first in Terre-Rouge, the second at l'Eyrette, just below the Infernet Fortress. They were thus protected by the summit ridge of Gondran down to Briancon. Practically invisible from the Italian side, they were located 9300 meters from their target with a vertical drop of 1100 meters. The position of Terre Rouge was later abandoned for the more promising Poët-Morand.
The 6th Battery of the 154th RAP consisted of four 280mm Schneider mortars and four 220mm pieces. Two 280mm mortars in open plots and the four 220mm pieces were placed in the Poët-Morand, which will form the first section, the second section of the battery, composed of the other two 280mm mortars were installed at l'Eyrette.
During the winter of 1939, the two pieces placed at Poët-Morand were relocated in the Infernet Fort while l’Eyrette two mortars had dry stone shelters and corrugated iron roof built by Italian workers.
The second task was to organize a network of observation posts that allowed commanders to make the necessary corrections to the fire solutions during the bombardment.
In the years before World War II, the French were careful to collect huge amounts of data and had photographically surveyed the border with Italy, this painstaking work enabled the artillery officers in the sector of the Dauphiné, to control every inch of land they had to defend.
The bombing of Chaberton used three observers:
The first was placed on the slopes of the Infernet fortress was occupied by Lieutenant Miguet, an experienced and trained artillery officer who graduated from the prestigious École Polytechnique in Paris. As commander of the battery, it was his duty to collect all data sent by the observers and to dispatch the corrections to be made on the solutions.
The second observatory was placed in a VDP steel dome (direct vision and periscope) in the Janus fortifications part of the Ligne Maginot. Captain Weiss had a front row view on Chaberton. These two observers were charged with observing the short shots and lateral deviation
The third observatory was located at the Col de Granon. Captain Gaudart, officer of 154th RAP, from his position at Granon, he had a perfect side view of the north-west of Chaberton.
To these are added three minor observation posts located at Grand Maye, the Croix de Toulouse and the Croix de Bretagne. This network of observers was connected by telephone lines and radio so as to allow, at any time, the communication of all data.
Another issue emerged with this alpine terrain; the ‘fork’, a standard method of adjusting trajectories wouldn’t be possible. This process consists on firing short of target, then past the target, adjusting the solution and firing on target. In the case of Chaberton, any long shot would land in the valley on the Italian side, hidden by Chaberton itself. Instead, in June of 1940, they opted on a series of blows starting on the south face, moving up to the summit and the Fortress.
The officers had to solve another problem of the battery, the solution tables that were delivered were based on an elevation of a thousand meters, but the mortars would have to operate twice that altitude.
With patience and meticulousness, Lieutenant Miguet recalculated all the trajectory data tables. In 1936-1938 the mortars had some trial shots in the direction of Izoard and the Pic de Rochebrune. All those present remained impressed by the marksmanship and equally pleased with the reliability of the team.
The staff of the 6th Battery of the 154th RAP consisted of six officers, fourteen non-commissioned officers and 165 artillerymen.
Commanding Officer Lieutenant Miguet; the first section of 280mm mortars at Poët-Morand: Lieutenant Fouletier; the second section at l'Eyrette: Lieutenant Rigaud; the battery of four 220mm mortars: Lieutenant Rocheix.
In the spring of 1940, after nearly forty years of "Chabertonite" and ten years of meticulous preparation, everything was ready, the battery would be Chaberton’s contender.
The French were well prepared and the Italians never knew who or what had destroyed their invincible Fortress. They only learned later when the French explained what had happened. Everything had been prepared with the utmost secrecy.
The Italian intelligence agencies, so zealous in controlling the so-called "home front", weren’t as good as the French spy in the years before World War II. The Italian forces had received lists of mobile, impossible or simply inexistent artillery sites, even though they had used aerial reconnaissance. This explains in many ways Chaberton’s seemingly random shots and their inability to detect the location of the French mortars.
Closer cross-border controls might have led to the discovery or at least the hint that something unpleasant was being prepared for Chaberton. The Battery of mortars was even filmed by a film crew from Studio Pathé and the movie projected during the winter of 1939 in all cinemas. A trained eye would have had no difficulties at identifying the surrounding mountains to determine where the mortars had been placed.Lieutenant Fouletier, commander of the first section, clearly wrote in his diary that questioning the Italian workers, involved in the construction of mortar's shelters at l’Eyrette, upon their return in Italy, would have been enough to endanger the French Battery.
None of this was done, the naivety with which the Italian high command relied on the Chaberton battery, leaves many speechless. During the only day that the French observers had the Italian battery in sight, free from the clouds, their shots were destructive.
As previously hinted, the lives of the gunners of Chaberton had only been protected by the clouds and their fortunate underground shelters.
In memory of Monsieur Louis Fouletier Officier and Gentleman.Cause - Effect! The consequence.The little military cemetery of Cesana Torinese (1940).
The italian fallen of the :"Battle of the Alps".
In autumn 1941 received also the fallen Chaberton, initially buried on the summit of the mountain.
Acknowledgements.Thank you very much to -LUC- for the translation and correction of the draft.
Thank you very much to the Colonel Max Schiavon, writer of the bestseller : Juin 1940, La derniere victoire, La destruction du Fort du Chaberton", for his valuable advice and friendship. Consulted archives and bibliography.A.U.S.S.M.E Rome
I.S.C.A.G Rome.
1° R.E.P. Turin
S.H.A.T. Paris.
External LinksThe Destroyer of the Chaberton Copyright.This article and all the images come from the private archive of Roberto Guasco.It is forbidden any use without written permission of the owner. Images
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