Well, seems to be plenty of low hang'n fruit to pick, the path of least resistance...
It's easy to jump on board and declare that "I would have...," from what I've read I could easily do so myself. However, I was not there to witness the specific conditions at that specific time.
We've all taken chances that we look back upon and question. By my own reckoning, I know that I certainly have. Some would say that if you're not taking chances, you're not climbing. Extreme skiers are no different. Risk/reward, as others have alluded to.
Obviously, I was no witness to the weather event(s) which created the conditions at the time. Yet from looking at the avi forecast (NWAC) for SP on Sunday, I see "considerable" danger below 7k, "High," above. Seems they were well below 7k with little above them from what I've seen. Of course this is only one of many factors to consider, but it is a point of accuracy if the forecast I read was correct and the elevations around the immediate SP ski area are as I've read them to be.
That aside, I know nothing of the ski area in question so many of the other bugaboos that come with snow pack analysis come into question. Were they able to dig a pit on the actual slope they skied ? Was there a slope near with a similar aspect, angle, level of exposure... where they could have dug a pit before dropping in ? I have no idea what the top of that chute looks like, but I have dropped into more than a few narrow, steep and deep slots (BITD) where digging a pit was out of the question.
The obvious is obvious... If you need to activate a beacon, you've made a mistake. But rather than make for the low hang'n fruit, it would seem more productive to learn all that can be learned from this incident and apply it to our own decision making process.
RIP. Condolences to those who've lost.