SHIPWRECKED ON MONT-BLANC - THE VINCENDON AND HENRY TRAGEDY
This tragedy occurred on the Eve of Christmas 1956. The agony of two young climbers followed by the whole of France has marked generations of French climbers and the whole French climbing community, professionals and amateurs alike.
For the 60th anniversary of the event, the new edition of the successful book written by Yves Ballu 20 years before - Naufrage au Mont-Blanc - (Glénat 1997 and Guerin Editions Paulsen 2017) - which provided the base data for this article with quotes the author obtained from the protagonists most marked with YB - had a foreword of one of the very few survivors of the drama, my friend Claude Dufourmantelle, who tried more than most to save the life of his friends.
I realized that this “News item” as Claude defines it had not had much coverage, if any, in the Anglo-Saxon world while it had as large an impact on the general French public than the Matterhorn Whymper’s caravan disaster on the 14th July 1865.
So here is the story of this exceptional "news item" which was the cornerstone of the creation of the French national mountain rescue unit - the renowned PGHM - and it starts with what was obvious to me, Claude’s foreword which qualifies and reflects so well this event with the hindsight of 60 years passed.
Written by Claude Dufourmantelle for the new edition of Yves Ballu’s Naufrage au Mont-Blanc - Guerin 2017
“May 1956, Algeria, Palestro’s ambush. Guy Mollet [then Prime minister] engages France definitively in a peace keeping of a sort which will soon become a fully-fledged war; Khrouchtchev crushes Hungary with an absent-minded Eisenhower looking on, too busy defending Aramco’s interests in Saudi Arabia, even at the expense of the Franco-British entangled in their Suez affair; Morocco becomes independent, pan Arabism and a political Islam establish themselves in the geopolitical world with the objective 'to dictate on us the oil prices'.
Kids and teenagers born during the war are now youngsters; for them, war and its wounds wander away and Americans, forerunners, enriched by those conflicts, spread over a convalescent Europe the image of James Dean and his rage to live. Those young men, those kids take mountaineering as a revival. This generation’s totem to do better that its elders - used up by the war - works its way by inventing new practises in alpinism with a rock’n’roll “à la Elvis” way.
60 years have gone by, already.
1956, a pivotal year, more than many others but which in “our dear and old country”[1bis] was marked by an exceptional news item, as in the end, this resounding drama was no more than a news item, what most called “the Vincendon and Henry affair”.
During the 1956 Christmas holidays, young men – city-boys - work out a plan to climb one of the Italian side Mont-Blanc routes. The enterprise is serious.
Winter climbing is not then a well admitted practise for the majority of climbers and is even taboo for mountain guides. It was a transgression, a disruption some would say today.
The enterprise turned foul: two young men lost their life after ten days of ordeal and agony, castaways on the mountain and castaways in full view of everyone.
This drama took a considerable extent; one must call to mind recent events to find the level of emotion that our country experienced then during several weeks. As a counterpoint of “Vincendon and Henry”, re-emerged the painful memory of the rescue attempt of the Malabar Princess, only 6 years old then. as sound boxes.
It is also the appearance of the helicopter in mountain rescue. Miracle resource to move in fast and efficiently, but also a lame excuse for not “going” and wait for the weather window which will allow the lifesaving flight but alas differed. Miraculous helicopter so, but the usage of which will only become routine after the tough usage that the armed forces will experience for the maintenance of law and order during the following years[2bis]
Forty years later, our friend Yves Ballu undertook to relate this tragedy: he did it with the passion of an investigative journalist and the seriousness of an academic historian. He collected all testimonies, triangulated all the information, minutely established the chronologies and, by doing all of this, put all the characters "in their place", for what they had said, for what they had done and, unfortunately, more often than not, for what they had not done. The reward for this work was the success of this book. It is also the work of a sociologist, as the reader will see in it a painting of a specific period of mountaineering, of a specific environment, where the media began to impose its code and pace.
Beyond the news item, the antique promethean tragedy of agony and death of the two heroes; some will say a terrible ordeal. After all, it is the same thing.
I was 23, one of those young men, one of those kids more intent maybe to dream of adventures than to suffer the sternness of the tuition of the École Centrale[2 ter]. And I was not hearing the taboo that forbade to use crampons or skis elsewhere than on ski runs. Already the previous year I had attempted that route, alas - or luckily - covered by deep snow and without much hope. The success in December 1956 in which luck and the talent of my friend François-Xavier Caseneuve (whom I often call Xavier) had played their role, was for Jean Vincendon who wanted to imitate us one of those signs that gods send to those they want to take to their doom.
Fate played us a rotten trick and a merciless machinery had been activated.
Life has moved past. I became a mountain guide, I worked, I had kids and with old age I became one of those men whose behavior was not understandable during the affair, the indifference or passivity of whom then hurt me. I slipped myself under the skin of each of the key players involved and I understood over time that each one, with his impediments and his weaknesses, had done “as he could” in his own world. This drama had subsume and devoured us all, and in this tragedy, there are no good and bad ones but only men and fate’s traps.
Twenty more years have passed [since Yves Ballu book was first published] and I have the privilege to be one of the last witnesses and players of this affair. Transitional privilege which I feel deeply.
Privilege to have lived a national drama and an antic tragedy in a modest and powerless acting role. Privilege to have lived the end of a period in mountaineering history and to have discreetly participated in it. Privilege to still be there to say as the poet “how beautiful mountains are”….
(nickname Le Duf)
 In an ambush a commando of the ALN [Armée de Libération Nationale] kills the 21 men of a French army platoon, several being murdered after their capture.
[1bis]According to General de Gaulle’s familiar expression.
 Paris-Match: leading French weekly magazine - RTF: Radio Télévision Française, national radio and unique TV channel then.
[2bis] Reference to the Algerian war in which Dufourmantelle and many of his young climbing friends participated.
[2ter] Ecole centrale: one of the most prestigious engineers school with the Ecole polytechnique.
1. VINCENDON & HENRY
1.1. Jean Vincendon
In 1956, Jean Vincendon is 23 years old.
Born and educated in Paris, he started climbing on the Fontainebleau sandstone boulders.
Fairly light weight and 5 feet 6, he has not yet done any big alpine routes but the Arête Sud de la Noire de Peuterey in 1955 nor any serious ice climbs, but the previous year he was admitted (11 out of 14) at the Aspirant-guide course (ENSA Chamonix); his teachers were Armand Charlet, André Contamine and Louis Lachenal who impressed him most.
Like his hero, he dreams to go on a Himalayan expedition and climbing big alpine routes which would open him the doors of the GHM, the exclusive club with the best French climbers.
He will meet his future climbing partner, François Henry on the Freyr rocks in the Ardennes (the main Belgium climbing cliffs).
1.2. FRANÇOIS HENRY
Belgian from Brussels, at 21 François Henry is two years younger. Strongly built, 6 feet 3 inches, he started climbing at Freyr (Ardennes), the main Belgian rock climbing crag 4 years before. He is the one who will carry the heavier rucksack.
His father, Louis Henry, a chemist, and his mother, Jeanne, were active members of the Zero resistance network. Arrested by the Gestapo they were sent to Dachau, Ravensbruck and Mathausen. They will survive miraculously, but Jeanne weakened dies in 1950.
François meets Vincendon on the Freyr rocks and starts climbing with him.
2. THE BRENVA SPUR
In 1956 winter ascents are not accepted as a standard practice, only for “the strong ones who can only count on themselves »
This opinion is largely shared by the Chamonix mountain guides. This will only change with a new generation of guides in the 1960s.
Vincendon got the Brenva Spur idea while in Chamonix listening to Dufourmantelle describing his 1955 winter attempt to climb the route with his partners, François-Xavier Caseneuve (nicknamed the Yeti) and André Brun, all three students at the école Centrale in Paris. They gave up at the start of the spur due to heavy snowfalls. They then decided to make another attempt in December 1956. Several weeks after their first attempt (25th February 1955), two other well-known Paris alpinists, Jean Couzy and André Vialatte, made the first winter ascent, light and fast. They went up the Aiguille du Midi with the brand new cable-car (opened in the summer 1955), skied down the first part of the Vallée Blanche and went up to the Bivouac-refuge of La Fourche (3682 m). Starting from there at 4:45 am, they reached the Mur de la Côte at 7:30 pm and avoiding the Mont-Blanc summit, descended directly from there by the Corridor, stopping on the Grand-Plateau to await for the moon and then reached the Grands Mulets at midnight. A 24 hours Chamonix-Chamonix around trip and the next day Vialatte was taking a train back to Paris! Speed-climbing is not so novel!
Vincendon would have liked to join the Duf/Yeti team, as both, although 23 years old, were already seasoned alpinists (Claude Dufourmantelle started climbing at the age of 15) with a number of quite serious ice routes under their belts. Furthermore, both students at the École Centrale, they had climbed together for several years and were technically at par. They made a very strong climbing party. Terray will testify during the event in an interview to Europe I that “Monsieur Dufourmantelle is a very good alpinist”.
 As written by Claude Deck in the first article about the drama published in La Montagne et Alpinisme, the CAF and FFM magazine, 26 years after the event. Lucien Devies, CAF and FFM president had prevented anything to be written in the magazine up to then in order to avoid damaging controversies with the Chamonix mountain guides and the parties involved be made public.
3. THE DUF & THE YETI ASCENT
1. THE DUFOURMANTELLE AND XAVIER CAZENEUVE ASCENT - 18th of December.
On the 17th December, at the end of the morning, they leave Chamonix, take the Aiguille du Midi Cable-car thanks to the man then in charge (the Cable-car is closed), ski down the first part of the Vallée Blanche, and go up to the Bivouac-refuge of La Fourche, climbing the steep 150 m La Fourche couloir.
They sleep at the bivouac-refuge and start at 7 am. [3bis]
They reach the top of the Brenva route at 6 pm (using their headlamps for the last hour - at this time of the season, night falls at 5 pm) and there, like Jean Couzy and Vialatte they ignore the Mont-Blanc summit, go to the Brenva Col, then head straight down to Chamonix by the Corridor and the Grand Plateau.
They had specifically chosen the date to benefit from the full moon and so avoid a bivouac. They reach the Grands Mulets refuge around midnight where they sleep all day before resuming their descent to Chamonix. As planned they made a fast round trip ascent, fast style: around 18 hours non-stop from La Fourche to the Grands-Mulets and were equipped accordingly, light.
Everything had gone according to plan, but for their last day when crossing the glacier to reach the Junction, Le Duf fell 20 m down in a crevasse losing his ice-ax and a crampon. The Yeti helped him out to safety after much effort, using cord loops.
Back in Chamonix, they meet Vincendon and Henry on the 21th of December at Le Choucas[3ter], tell them the details of their ascent. Le Duf and the Yeti advise them in case of bad weather to go down on the Brenva route or if at the top of the spur to go up to the Mont-Blanc summit and Vallot as the snow going down directly to the Grands Mulets is deep and in that case to be careful with the crevasses and he insists:
“Do not go to the summit unless everything is fine, otherwise go down.”
Another friend, Bob Xueref told them: “whatever, go to the summit for security. If we have to come to fetch you, it will be by the Aiguille du Gouter.”[YB]
4. THE HAND OF FATE
DAY 1-3 Saturday-Monday (22nd-24th)
Vincendon and Henry meet Walter Bonatti and Silvano Gheser.
They leave Chamonix on the 22nd with huge rucksacks.
Contrarily to Le Duf and the Yeti (and the Couzy-Vialatte party) they decided to take a “Himalayan type” equipment. They even have a tent!
They take also the Aiguille du Midi cable car. They have skis to go from the Aiguille du Midi to the foot of the La Fourche couloir, but they are not good enough skiers and their loads are too heavy, so they leave the skis at the bottom of the first slope.
Meanwhile Walter Bonatti has planned to make the first winter ascent of The Pear. A much more difficult ascent than the Brenva Spur starting also from the refuge-bivouac of La Fourche. The route is to the left of the Brenva Spur. His rope mate is Silvano Gheser, a lieutenant and ski-climbing instructor of the Alpini.
They start on the 18th for a reconnaissance to La Fourche refuge-bivouac and find ideal conditions. Coming down they see two dots high on the Brenva, Le Duf and le Yeti, going fairly fast.
On the 24th, with his partner Silvano Gheser they take the Torino cable car and are told about two French who have slept the previous night at the Torino refuge.
Approaching the slope going up to the Col de La Fourche, they see the two French coming down. They had given up because of a veil of clouds in the morning which worried them. Bonatti sees not a cloud around. When he tells the two French that is name is Bonatti and that he is going to make the first winter ascent of The Pear, they change their mind and follow him up to the refuge-bivouac of La Fourche.
Several days later, the Nuova Stampa will publish an interview of Bonatti in which he stated: “That day, conditions were ideal, better than in summer… And for me there is no better way to celebrate Christmas than to spend it up there, between sky, ice and rock. It is my passion. Some celebrate Christmas with a turkey, cakes and sparkling wine, others with a Christmas Eve dinner at the casino… As far we are concerned, we like the freezing wind at 4000 meters high and the stars which seem so near. Splendid joys but difficult to understand and explain…"
From the refuge, Bonatti and Gheser go onto the Brenva glacier to the Col Moore to see how good the snow is, knowing that this part of the route is common with La Brenva and that their tracks will benefit Vincendon and Henry. The snow is good but in cutting steps Bonatti caused a slight but long crack on his ice axe shaft. Back at La Fourche, Bonatti makes a makeshift repair of his ice axe shaft. "I repaired the cracked shaft by wrapping it in a tight corset of strong twine, which made it perfectly serviceable." 
Seeing that, Henry who was second on the French-Belgian rope and so did not have to cut steps, offers his which Bonatti accepts:
“La Poire needs perfect equipment, he [Henry] said to minimize his generosity."
He also notes the excellence of their equipment, “better than ours, particularly their long down sleeping bags capable of sustaining low temperatures…” In return Bonatti offers them to climb with him to The Pear. But he knows that in the end Vincendon and Henry will not accept as their training and acclimatization is far too insufficient for such a climb. Soon, Vincendon, knowing that The Pear is too difficult a climb for him and Henry, decides to stick with the Brenva.
 Bonatti My Mountains - Christmas on Mont-Blanc
5. THE ASCENT
5.1. TUESDAY - DAY 4 (25th)
Woken up at 2:30 am, they leave the refuge-bivouac at 4 am. The first steps in the cold are painful.
At the col Moore, the two parties separate, the Italians traverse left to the foot of The Pear while the French start on the Brenva Spur. But Bonatti soon finds that they started too late: the sun rose while they reach a steep couloir with unstable snow below The Pear itself. The route is now prone to avalanches.
At 8:30 am they turn down and decide to join Vincendon and Henry on the Brenva Spur not exposed to avalanches. They make a long diagonal traverse up to the spur and once there Bonatti is astonished to find that the Franco-Belgian party is below them. Heavily laden, they have been slow, but they do not seem in a difficult situation.
The sun is on them and they see the tracks left by Dufourmantelle and Caseneuve. Between 2 pm and 3 pm the Italians stop to eat, but Vincendon and Henry still do not catch up with them. They are far too slow.
Bonatti starts again as he knows that the last part of the route is steeper and may require step cutting, which will help the French party.
At 3:30 pm they are 100 m below the last seracs near the steep part ending the spur. In normal conditions, one would need one to two more hours to reach the Mont-Blanc summit and about the same time to reach the Vallot refuge below the Bosses ridge. But it is winter, the last slope of the spur is steep, and as they progress up, the wind gets fiercer and night comes down fast. Half an hour more and they would be above the last difficulty just below the top of the spur but night is on them and the weather suddenly changes. A massive storm falls on them. The wind is blowing at 70 km/h or more.
“In those circumstance, it would have been normal to lose our life” will say Bonatti.[YB ]
 An avalanche falling over 1000 m and filling the Brenva bowl will occur just after they reached the Brenva Spur. A wise decision from Walter. He added in his tale in Mountains of my Life that "A little altimeter/barometer would have been enough to warn us the previous night... But in those days no one made much use of them (I used one constantly from then on precisely because of this experience). Nor where there any reliable weather forecasts. At that time everyone trusted his own empirical observation and relied on vague premonitory signs."
5.2. THE FIRST BIVOUAC IN THE STORM
Bonatti looks for a shelter and finds a hole that he enlarges with his ice-axe. Gheser has his feet freezing, he only took cotton socks, a gross mistake. Bonatti will give him his elephant foot sleeping
bag. About 100 m below Vincendon and Henry spend the night in a snow hole.
Fourteen hours of storm without being able to sleep and in the morning 40 cm of fresh snow cover them. The storm is still raging, they are covered by a deep mist and the snow continues to fall. Vincendon and Henry do not feel well but do not want to go down as Caseneuve and Dufourmantelle advised them to do. As Bonatti will state later, they were then too high, near the top of the spur, and the snow fall had been such that going down would have been far too dangerous due to the risk of avalanches. In the morning, Bonatti goes down to fetch them using his two ropes attached together for the first 80 m. They join Gheser awaiting in his hole. Henry has his left foot frozen, but with Bonatti’s presence, their spirit is still high.
5.3. THE SUMMIT OF THE SPUR IN THE STORM
Bonatti understands that without his help, they will not get through so he puts them on his rope, Gheser, then Vincendon and Henry. Blind in the storm he finds a way through the snow maze. He misses out the easy exit on the right leading to the Brenva Col and takes the middle exit (out of the 3 possibles ones - see the Guide Vallot photo of the Brenva Spur route - Chapter 3). This straight line to overcome the final séracs has technical difficulties that the Dufourmantelle and Caseneuve party did not encounter. It is already 3 pm when suddenly the sky clears up: they see the summit. They are some 150 m above the Brenva Col (4303 m), on the top of the ridge of the Mur de la Côte, 350 m below the summit, between the Lower and Upper Red Rocks.
Bonatti’s instinct and experience have saved them. But they are not yet out of danger. Bonatti starts straight for the Grands Mulets by the Old lower passage (Passage Balmat), but after going down 100 m with snow up to his waist he finds that the snow fallen on the ice undercover is unstable and dangerous. A solution could be to cross diagonally to the Vallot refuge roughly located at the same altitude, but the snow there is also deep and will be as avalanche prone. The last solution, the easiest and safest, is to get up to the Mont-Blanc summit and descend the Bosses ridge to the Vallot refuge at 4300 m.
There, the freezing Northern wind has blown away the excess snow, so the slope is firm on the feet and easy. But going up with a violent wind means a tiresome effort, particularly after the ordeal of their 14 hours bivouac in the storm. The two parties take back their independence in order to "go as fast as possible" , and start up the Mont-Blanc last slope, first side by side.
 Bonatti My Mountains - Christmas on Mont-Blanc.
5.4. MONT-BLANC SUMMIT AND VALLOT FOR BONATTI-GHESER - 2nd BIVOUAC BELOW THE SUMMIT FOR VINCENDON-HENRY - WEDNESDAY - DAY 5 (26th)
After an hour the French slow down. 110 m below the summit, at the Petits Mulets, Bonatti sees them lagging two to three ropes lengths behind (some 30/40 m in altitude and 100 m in length ) and shouting in the fierce wind he encourages them to go faster, to which they respond "No problem", but Vincendon is tired, he doesn’t feel his feet, they may be frozen. He knows though that he must follow Bonatti’s tracks.
Bonatti is worried, in two hours and a half, night will be on them and he knows that a third night out in the open might means death so he wants to reach Vallot before sunset and Gheser shows signs of weakening. Bonatti does not want to slow down, he knows (and he is probably the only one to see the situation so clearly) that with a 70km/h wind and a minus 30°C temperature the result is a minus 70°C. Stopping is deadly. They must go on. Bonatti concentrates on the task and keeps on, thinking that the slope being easy and with their tracks, Vincendon and Henry will have no difficulty to follow. He reaches the summit as night is coming down in a polar and furious wind. Without stopping, with Gheser, they go down the arête des Bosses and it's pitch-dark when they reach Vallot.
5.5. BONATTI AND GHESER ORDEAL (26th-30th)
Bonatti and Gheser reach Vallot at nightfall. The sheet metal made refuge is in an appalling state, everything is frozen inside, impossible to light a fire - the temperature that night inside the refuge was 0°C, no food no medicine, nothing but frozen blankets.
Bonatti will write later:
“I realized the seriousness of Gheser feet frostbites... there was not a moment to lose, with a half-liter of methylated alcohol - the fuel for our boiler we hadn't used - I started to violently massage his frozen limbs..." 
They set up a candle on a windows sill to guide the French when they would arrive, but they do not.
"We were more and more worried about Vincendon and Henry who still had not appeared. Every so often I looked through the door... but nothing could be seen... I wondered with anguish if, too exhausted, they could have decided to bivouac somewhere high up which would have been a tragic mistake... ”
All night long, Bonatti will ask himself the question:
“Why haven’t they arrived?”
In the morning the storm still raging, they await for the French during two hours. Bonatti stated later:
"And now we could not do anything to help them... I could not imagine that so high up Vincendon and Henry, only a little distance behind us, were going to take, without us knowing, the most absurd of decisions : turn back down (but this is what they did!) and then go for the couloir of the Old Passage which we had avoided as being extremely dangerous. Why would Vincendon and Henry do such a folly? I don't know. No one will ever know ... With this tragic mistake, the poor boys sealed their own fate...” 
In the morning of the 27th they wait several hours for Vincendon and Henry to arrive. Bonatti decides against going down to Chamonix, although a much shorter way, but to go down to Gonella via the Bionassay ridge believing the snow there will be less avalanche prone.
He decides that he must save Gheser whose feet are so swollen that he cannot put his boots on. With the Vallot blankets and bits of a sleeping bag Bonatti makes some makeshift shoes fixing on them Gheser’s crampons with lanyards, belts and wire.
They finally leave Vallot at 10 am, descending via the Bionassay ridge, in a maze of séracs, crevasses and mounds of snow. Bonatti knows that he must lose altitude and that friends coming up from Courmayeur should be at Gonella awaiting them.
A snow bridge breaks and Bonatti falls 20 m in the crevasse below before being stopped by the block of snow formed between his legs. Gheser blocks the main rope and Bonatti first using the rope climbs up until the crevasse narrows and continues with his crampons, but the end is overhanging. He asks Gheser to make loops on one of the rope's ends, lower it to him and fix it securely. Using one loop he swings his body several times until he reaches the crevasse’s opening and with the help of Gheser gets out of the crevasse. The manœuvre has taken two hours and a half, time is 5 pm and Gonella is still 700 m below. They have to bivouac again.
Translation of the Newspaper French text:
Diagram of the abysmal crevasse Bonatti fell into. He was saved thanks to the rope linking him with Gheser. After coming around, the Italian alpinist (in the middle) did the splits and put his feet where the crevasse narrowed. Then he let himself down on a snow bridge 10 m below (bottom). Bonatti hauled himself up to the opening thanks to loops he made on the rope used as aiders. When he reached the snow crust which blocked the way out (up) he balanced his body on another rope loop put under his armpits and with an extraordinary pull-up, came to the surface.
This rope with aiders hand made in the abyss allowed Bonatti to escape death.
They take shelter against a sérac. The cold is intense. Bonatti gives Gheser his thicker mittens and the hood of his anorak. He had already given Gheser his elephant foot down exanging it with Gheser's rubber linen bivvy sack. He could do no more and as in his terrible bivouac at 8 100 m on K2 he kept on beating his boots with his ice axe until feeling the pain which meant his blood was flowing again.
At 5 am, the moon shows up with a perfect weather, then a bright sun. They know they will survive.
It will take them a full day, advancing slowly, sometimes on all four, to reach Gonella where they find good blankets and wood to make a fire, but no food. Meanwhile Bonatti's Italian friends have organised a rescue party from Courmayeur and will reach them two days after, on the 30th.
Bonati and Gheser are saved, the indestructible Bonatti is unscathed, but Gheser will lose all his toes.
6. THE BONATTI CONTROVERSY
Ten days later, a journalist published an interview of Gheser on in hospital bed, hands and feet covered with bandages. Gheser’s story is full of toponymical errors and differs on some points from Bonatti's. Bonatti decided to ignore it in order not to give it any credit and corrected the factual errors in his first book published in 1961, "To My Mountains" as he stated  “made by irresponsible journalists looking after a scoop and with no expertise in mountaineering”.
It all came flooding back 40 years later when Ballu wrote his book.
I took contact with Ballu after he put a comment on my article and he told me that although he had difficult exchanges with Bonatti which led to this controversy he did not want to bring in his book anything of it. He estimated that a number of Bonatti’s responses to his questions were unsatisfactory as they did not explain what he saw as contradictions between Bonatti’s book To My Mountains published in 1961 and the earliest testimonial of Bonatti published in the 1957 article of Sport et Vie as well as the 1957 article in the CAI La Rivista Mensile written by Bonatti and decided to disregard Bonatti’s book more detailed text to privilege those published nearest to the time of the event, adding to it Gheser’s testimonial published at the same time in La Settima Incom Illustrata. Ballu used also a handwritten letter he obtained in 1997 from Gheser replicating his 1957 "hospital's interview" with some more details which were absent from his 1957 interview. So when writing first my article I did not know anything which had gone on between Ballu and Bonatti.
With the information Ballu gave me and particularly a letter Bonatti sent him in February 1998 asking in quite civil terms for changes to his manuscript, I now understand why Walter was infuriated to the point of threatening Ballu and his publisher (Glenat) to take them to court and why he wrote a damning and enraged text in 1999 published in La Rivista which was reproduced in his posthumous book published in 2014 Walter Bonatti Una Vita cosi, three years after his death, accusing Ballu to insinuate that he had abandoned V&H. At the end of his February 1998 letter Walter states that as he is going to Jordan for several months he will not be back before the publication of the book, and so he asked Ballu to send him his corrected text. When back from Jordan, he discovered that Ballu’s book not only did not contain any of the corrections he had requested but that it had been published in December 1997, more than a month before he had sent his letter to Ballu. He must have felt betrayed and was fuming. He complained to Ballu’s publisher who defended the work done by Ballu. Later he prevented the first Italian publication to occur.
For Bonatti, Gheser’s memory 40 years after the event was as confused as it had been in 1957, erroneous on many aspects and on almost all the toponymy where the events took place. In this 1999 article published la Rivista as Ballu told me and which I read in Bonatti’s book Walter Bonatti Una Vita cosi, Bonatti states:"... Gheser's absurdities were so many and such that even an inexperienced alpinist would never have accepted to vet them."
In 1999, an Italian publisher took the risk to publish Ballu’s book and in the end Walter did not start any legal action against anyone. I assume that his friends persuaded him that considering the contradictions in his various testimonials and writings and the fact that Ballu’s text did not imply directly any defamatory judgment there was no way he could win anything.
Among the controversial points between him and Ballu two stood up:
a) statements that Bonatti's ice-axe shaft which he had exchanged with Henry's was broken while it only had a slight longitudinal crack and was still usable hence he never had any intention to go back to Courmayeur contrarily to what Gheser stated. 40 years after the event: in his handwritten letter to Ballu, Gheser mentioned that "Henry climbed the Brenva with an ice axe in two pieces." How absurd! Unfortunately Bonatti had used the wrong term of "broken" (rotto) in an article published in the CAI magazine a few days after the events which he only rectified many years after in later versions of his book "To My Mountains" using the more proper term "cracked" (incrinato). Be that as it may this is a minor point and had no impact noted by anyone on Vincendon and Henry’s ascent of the Brenva spur. The following is the key point that caused Bonatti’s rage:
b) that they separated from Vincendon & Henry when the French-Belgium party decided to stop to take a rest at a place not far from the summit which for Bonatti would imply that he did abandon them. Bonatti denied this to have happened. He explained that they took back their autonomy as two ropes parties at the altitude of 4 450 m, some 50 m below the top of the Upper Red Rocks after their attempt to go down to the Grand Mulets via the "Old passage". The last slopes going up to the summit of Mont-Blanc were obvious and easy enough even to be climbed unroped, so continuing as two rope parties was more secure and faster.
If one follows the succession of events described by Gheser in his letter to Ballu, one can deduct that this "separation"occurred at that point implying that Bonatti did not abandon them. But as in his testimonial, Gheser’s toponymy is erroneous and Ballu’s book lack of a clear situation of place and timing of those actions, one could think, as Bonatti did in reading Ballu’s text, that it occurred higher, below the "Petits Mulets", 150 m below the summit implying that he would have abandoned V&H. Gheser is mistaking the "Old passage" with "the Corridor"and the “Mur de la Côte” with the “Brenva Col”. In fact, all the toponymy in Gheser's testimonial is erroneous: they would have reached the Brenva Col and started down the Corridor, while this never occurred. They got out of the Brenva spur way to the left, 100 m above the Brenva Col, and Bonatti attempted to go down the "Old passage" between the Upper and Lower Red Rocks and not the Corridor. Those basic but major errors obvious to an alpinist who has climbed Mont-Blanc from this side (the three Mont-Blanc route being the most obvious one) indicate that Gheser did not know where he was. He did not know the area, he was blindly following Bonatti, worrying about his frozen feet. But it does not mean that all his testimonial is erroneous as the infuriated Bonatti wrote. Note that Ballu chose not to quote in his book any of Gheser’s toponymical errors.
As far as stopping to eat which Gheser stated Vincendon and Henry wanted to do (and Bonatti in Sport et Vie), Bonatti explained this to be complete nonsense as it was impossible to do so in the polar wind they were then facing with nowhere to take shelter, so for him it only occurred in Gheser's confused mind. Silvano did not speak a word of French and just could not understand what Vincendon & Henry were saying. Bonatti always wrote (and not 40 years after) that they regained their rope party autonomy from a common consent including in the 1957 Sport et Vie testimonial:” and in order not to lose any of the precious day light we decided from a common consent to reform our two rope parties.” This occurred at around 4 450 m and not below the Petits Mulets i.e. 200 m or so higher.
However it seems weird that Gheser would have"invented" the fact that V&H and himself did take off their rucksacks for a rest - and eventually something to eat - after having come back up from their attempt to go down the “Old passage”. They were then some 50 m below the top of the Upper Red Rocks, where the “Old passage” starts so at the altitude of 4 450 m as claimed by Bonatti. And when reading Gheser's testimonial carefully, although quite succinct, one can assume it is the altitude where he situated their "separation" corroborating then Walter's story. So blinded by his rage Walter was probably at the time unable to read properly Gheser's testimonial. And this is the key point. It is unfortunate that due to Gheser too vague and erroneous toponymy Ballu did not situate in his book this part of the action nor indicated any timing, quoting erroneously the timing of 14h30 as the time when they separated instead of what it was: the time they got out of the spur. One hour difference which changes the whole chronology of the events. He does write that they got out of the spur at 4 500 m, but then he uses two pages describing their action up until the moment V&H stopped and separated with Bonatti & Gheser. That made Bonatti believe that it implied that they were much higher, below the Petits Mulets, some 150 m or so below the summit. For him that meant that one could then say that being so far up and near the summit he had abandoned the two boys. When reading in Ballu’s book the dialogue of two imaginary characters,one saying: “Bonatti could have waited for them… If they could not follow, it means they had a problem… So he should not have left them behind. At any rate they should have continued being on the same rope until the refuge…” I can understand why Bonatti was so infuriated. Ballu told me during our recent exchanges that in no way did he want to imply such a thing and he also agreed that this separation occurred some 300 m below the summit. Duly noted.
"All this story, false, dreamed, told by Ballu, would not be as serious if, he had placed it where we were, at the Old passage where we reformed our two parties to pursue our route to the summit. Ballu placed it more at around 4700 m, at the Petits Mulets, and just before losing sight of the two boys below us."
Ballu agreeing that it occurred near the altitude claimed by Bonatti, it is then a pity that they could not clear that point before the book was published and that Ballu did not make an amendment in the following editions, particularly in this latest one. Bonatti is dead and no one did ever object to Ballu but Bonatti, so I guess he saw no reason to do so.
From Gheser's somewhat confused memory but confirming the "altitude of the separation", from what Bonatti did state publicly and wrote after the event and considering Bonatti's exceptional character, despite the contradictions of Bonatti's writings, my conviction is that Bonatti is right as far as the place and reasons of the separation are concerned.
For me the most credible chronology ofthe events is as follows:
1. Top of the spur (when the sky clears up) :
- 14h30 (Sport et vie and La Settima Incom Illustrata) max15h (To My Mountains)
- Altitude 4 500 m (To My Mountains) “300 m below Mont Blanc summit when they were at the top of the spur”.
2. Attempt to go down the Old passage :
- around 1 hour, perhaps 45’, to go down from 4 500 to 4 400 m and climb back up to 4 450 m (Start of the Old passage and Walter Bonatti Una Vita cosi).
- from 14h30 till 15h30 - max 16h (Gheser 1997 letter to Ballu) - they go down about 100 m but from their high point above the Mur de la Côte, 4 500 m, so 50 m down to the start of the Old passage and 50 m down in it. Then they turned back and climbed 50 m up to the start of the Old passage, at 4 450 m where Bonatti makes a sign to Vincendon to join him. 45’ to 1 hour max, so the time is then 15h30, max 16h.
- Decision is taken to go to Vallot via the summit of Mont Blanc and to get back to their respective rope parties. But V&H, followed by Gheser, drop their rucksacks to take a rest. Hassled by Bonatti, Gheser put back his rucksack on his shoulders and untie the rope linking him to Henry. V&H follow at most several minutes later. Gheser will only look back when they will be above the Petits Mulets, 100 m below the summit (His 1997 letter to Ballu : « but arrived at around 4 600 m in full night, they must have suffered an impossible bivouac ») Bonatti, leading, must have looked regularly down, to watch his rope partner progress, hence his more detailed testimonial in his book To My Mountains which unfortunately Ballu decided to disregard.
3. V&H final stop.
- 16h30 (Sport &Vie, Bonatti:« During about one hour V&H have followed our tracks» so up to an altitude of 4 600/4620 m (Sport et Vie, Bonatti: « … to the summit of the Red Rocks» = the Small Red Rocks - and Walter Bonatti Una Vita Cosi « We walked during at least one hour together up until we reached and went past the small rock spike called the Petits Mulets, which emerges at about 4700 metres, then very near the summit. But then I turned around to fight against a gust of wind, and saw V&H, facing one another and speaking. They were at a distance of about 100 m directly below us. »). This is partially corroborated by Gheser 1997 testimonial: « but arrived at around 4 600 m in full night, they must have suffered an impossible bivouac ».
Considering those timings, Bonatti and Gheser testimonials, somehow slightly contradictory on the timing but only by a half hour maximum as far as their arrival to Vallot is concerned (For Bonatti in Sport et vie : « before nightfall », « at nightfall » for Gheser in the CAI La Revista Mensile 1957), one can deduct an average climbing speed between the point where they regained their autonomy (4 450 m to 4 500 m) to the point where V&H stopped to be 200 to 250 m per hour for B&G, which is quite sensible and only 100 to 150 m for V& H which is also quite sensible. An arrival of B&G on the summit of Mont Blanc at around 17h00 and Vallot at around 17h30.
This scenario implies that Bonatti did not « abandon » V&H, and also - for me but not for Ballu - that their separation was not due to V&H decision to stop and so not to follow B&G but for the reasons given by Bonatti in his 1957 Cai La Rivista Mensile’s article: “As this route [to Vallot by the summit of Mont Blanc] presented no difficulty, as one had just to walk and as the visibility was now good, to accelerate our progress, we separated in two ropes parties, me and Gheser, Vincendon and Henry”.
There remains a possibility, which is what Ballu prefers to believe, that they did not take back their autonomy at the top of the Old passage at 4 450 m, but that they continued and stopped some 50 m higher when they regained their autonomy for the reason that Bonatti did not want to stop and wait for them. But to me this seems much less credible, too contradictory with both Bonatti and Gheser’s testimonials. I will add also that Bonatti was no ordinary man, he was no ordinary climber, nor was he an ordinary mountaineer and an attitude which would be normal for so many was not for Bonatti. His many rescues in extreme conditions speak for him and I will quote Gheser in his 1957 testimonial when they were at Vallot: « For a moment, we wait for the arrival of V& H, standing up to hear an eventual shout asking for help. Bonatti wanted to go back up in search of V&H, but I managed to convince him that at night it would be suicidal.” I add that Bonatti waited 4 hours in the morning at Vallot for V&H and also what he wrote in To My Mountains : “ Many people did ask me how I could have ‘abandoned’ Vincendon and Henry… no one was nor could be abandoned… From a common consent we decided to take the most logical route in the most rational way, which is as two rope parties,without any abandon by any of us…” In any case as Ballu agrees that 4 500 m or about is for him the altitude where the separation occurred, it confirms that he also does not believe that Bonatti abandoned V&H.
Neither I nor Ballu can claim that we hold the whole truth. With no conclusive and corroborated testimonials, it is just the expression of our personal opinions and convictions. It is then anyone’s choice, not ours.
On the other minor points, I have now some doubts - though not so many - particularly one point in the letter Bonatti wrote to Ballu (Feb 1998) responding to his questions (15 in all) in great detail before Ballu published his book which Ballu sent me and published on his blog: Bonatti maintained that he never invited V&H to go with him to climb La Poire. A stupid lie contradicted soon after by himself in La Rivista's article. In it he explains that it was not a serious offer, he was just being nice. Certainly true as attempting the first winter ascent of the most difficult ice climb of this side of Mont Blanc with two unknown youngsters with no known experience would have been pure lunacy. But it was a lie and Ballu knowing it, it must have influenced strongly his decision to disregard Bonatti’s 1961 To My Mountains text to privilege the 1957 Bonatti testimonial and writing.
It is unfortunate that Ballu did not understand when writing his book how key the point of separation would be for Bonatti. Particularly at a time when the K2 Bonatti controversy was still raging (Bonatti’s recognition claims for his role on K2 was only validated by the CAI in 2004). Long-time back many of my friends objected to Ballu's book stating that he made dead men talk. As far as I was concerned I found that it made the story more vivid, but when I discovered that Bonatti felt outraged by Ballu's text  because for him it could imply that he could have had abandoned the two boys, I remembered the dialogue between the two imaginary characters page 396 of Ballu’s book and could not but agree with those friends as far as this single point of the story is concerned! But finally from what Ballu told me, it was not his intention at all and his admiration of Bonatti remains unchanged. Again duly acknowledged.
Walter has been criticized and slandered many times by the Italian press. Much nonsense flew around: at the time of the event, an Italian MP even asked Gheser to be punished for having as a military officer risked the life of rescuers for the sake of a private undertaking! But it had never come from the French who were his best supporters such as Pierre Mazeaud who had the Legion d’honneur awarded to him for his action during the 1961 Freney drama when Walter saved his life. That must have added to Walter’s fury.
One thing is sure: without the second to none climbing and human talents of Bonatti and his incredible physical abilities, Silvano Gheser would not have survived.
7. TWO CASTAWAYS ON MONT BLANC
Vincendon was more and more tired.
After their last exchange of words with Bonatti pressing them to follow him when they stopped two or three rope lengths below the Petits Mulets which Bonatti and Gheser had reached (the petits Mulets are the last rocks, 110 m below the summit of Mont-Blanc) - they were roughly 140m below the summit .
Vincendon obviously did not find the strength to follow Bonatti and Gheser’ tracks.
Vincendon was probably hit by a severe altitude sickness. Contrarily to Bonatti and Gheser, Vincendon and Henry had no training at all in altitude.
With night falling they bivouacked for the second time probably near the Small Red Rocks.
The next day - Thursday 27 - did they try again to reach the summit? No one will ever know. However, at one stage, they started down.
Secured by Henry, Vincendon was falling continuously. They were going down the slopes between the Upper and Lower Red Rocks (passage Balmat) with the aim to reach the Grand Plateau and the Grands Mulets refuge.
Vincendon made a 60 m fall somewhere in a steep couloir pulling along Henry with him.
They lost their glacier sun-glasses, rucksacks, gloves and François his crampons and his over boots. They bivouacked again at the bottom of the Upper Red Rocks at around 4200 m, having descended only 400 m in a full day[12bis] which shows how exhausted they must have been or at least Vincendon who was seen falling all the time by the observer the Chamonix guide Joseph Maffioli at the Brevent in charge of the ski patrollers.
The following morning, Friday the 28th, Henry managed to get Vincendon down to the Grand Plateau but probably partially blind due to the loss of their glacier sun-glasses, they lost their way and instead of going left onto the route leading to the Grands Mulets, they went straight down and stopped on the brim of the 300 m high icefall overhanging the Combe Maudite at around 3900 m.
THEY WERE TRAPPED!
 From the testimonial of Warrant-officer Blanc who spoke with François Henry after the crash of his helicopter, 3 days later.
[12bis] According to the observers from Planpraz and the Brévent, Simond, Pellin and Maffioli.
8. THE RESCUE
Thursday and Friday - DAY 6 and 7 (27th-28th)
8.1. The rescue system in 1956
Up to the end of the war, no national organised rescue system did exist. It was done by volunteers.
Lucien Devies the president of the FFM will institute the first national system basing himself on the well-established Austrian mountain rescue organisation, coordinating some 20 different rescue organisations by 1948. He was very active in the creation in Chamonix, capital city of mountaineering, of the then rescue system. In the Mont-Blanc range covered by Chamonix the number of rescues was such that the solution devised was a sharing system coordinated through the SCSM (Société Chamoniarde de Secours en Montagne); its president is Doctor Dartigue, a well appreciated GP. The SCSM itself was reporting to the FFM special rescue committee.
But the SCSM role was only to delegate the rescues to one of the three organisations in Chamonix with men and equipment. The Chamonix guides company, the ENSA (école Nationale de Ski et d'Alpinisme) and the EHM (école de Haute Montagne - French Army).
Dartigue only coordinates the rescue teams of those three Chamonix organisations:
- The powerful Chamonix guides company was jealous of its privileges. Only those born in the valley could join (with marked exceptions though: Gaston Rébuffat from Marseille and Lionel Terray from Grenoble but they had conquered Annapurna, the 1rst 8000m!)
- the ENSA (École nationale de ski et alpinisme) with its guides and teachers in charge of training the future ski instructors and mountain guides is a fairly new public body attached to the Sports department of the French Education ministry (the first national mountain guide diploma was created in 1948). However in winter there is no mountain guides course, only skiing instructors ones, so most of the mountain guides instructors are not available but a few who are covering both courses: mountain guiding in summer and skiing in winter.
- the EHM (Ecole de haute montagne) with its guides and instructors in charge of training French mountain troops.
Those independent organisations have their specific rules and command lines. Dartigue can’t order anyone to go on a rescue. It is up to each guide to decide and there is normally no rescue party
organised in winter.
Not referring to the SCSM, the St-Gervais guides company is much smaller and do handle far less mountain rescues, their spirit is far more easy going and they have participated in the 1950 Malabar Princess rescue aside the Chamonix guides. Louis Piraly is in charge and will be most reactive and helpful.
Besides those units, two important human components for the valley will be involved in the drama: alpinists from outside the valley, amateurs coming from cities, mostly from Paris and Geneva, such as Claude Dufourmantelle, Marcel Bron and their friends. However, as Claude Deck notes in his 1983 La Montagne et Alpinisme article: "in 1956, the brotherly pre-war emulation between amateurs and professionals had given way to somewhat bitter competition and rivalries." A leading French newspaper, France Observateur will publish just after the drama (10th January) an article going much further than Claude Deck, quoting an earlier statement from the Chamonix guides company's president:
“…The Chamonix guides company refuses to risk the life of Chamonix fathers to save two imprudents who ARE NOT FROM HERE… IN CHAMONIX THE OPINION IS THAT VINCENDON AND HENRY WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN DOWN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ALERT IF THEY HAD HAD THE LUCK TO HAVE BEEN BORN IN THE VALLEY.”
Finally, a public opinion largely shared in Chamonix will also play a role: “winter ascents did not exist, it was madness and suicidal, mad guys should only count on themselves."
 Fédération Française de la Montagne, created in 1945 by the sports minister with the delegation to organise mountain rescues in France. Its president Lucien Devies was also in charge of its rescue committee.
 Originally the EHM (Ecole de Haute Montagne), its name will be changed to the more appropriate EMHM (Ecole Militaire de Haute Montagne).
8.2. Organising the rescue - THE CHAMONIX GUIDES REFUSED TO GET INVOLVED.
On the 26th, while both parties are trying to get to the summit of Mont-Blanc, Le Duf, not knowing that Vincendon and Henry waited two days before starting their ascent thinks that something has happened and contacts doctor Dartigue who tells him that there is no rescue organised in winter and suggests to try Joseph Burnet at the Chamonix guides company, not being able to tell him if the guides from Chamonix or from St-Gervais are competent for a rescue on this side of Mont-Blanc. Two rescue parties could be sent up, one from St-Gervais and the Gouter refuge, the other from Chamonix and the Grands Mulets.
This is what had been done for the crash of the Malabar Princess 6 years before . Dufourmantelle contacts Burnet who refuses, telling him “Go yourself if you want.” The guide representative points out that the heavy snow falls of the previous night makes a rescue much too dangerous. With his fellow guides, they consider that sending men in such conditions is sending them to their death. In those years, mountain guides have very little experience of mountaineering in winter, fearing avalanches such as the one which took the life of René Payot during the 1950 Malabar Princess’s rescue, but as Le Duf points out, 60 years after, it was the peak of the skiing season with all the key expected income for the Chamonix guides.
Burnet having refused help, Dartigue gives a telephone call to Piraly, president of the St-Gervais guides, Dufourmantelle speaks with him but Piraly tells him that he has no guides available to
organise a rescue. Pierre Dartigue in charge of the Chamonix rescue is like a general without soldiers, unable to send men in a rescue![YB]
As far as Rébuffat is concerned, when approached by Remy de Vivie and Dufourmantelle, he told them that he had no spare equipment to lent them and that he was not interested to participate in a private rescue.
Jean Franco, leader of the highly successful 1955 Makalu first ascent is not yet the ENSA director (he will be the following year) but the manager of the UNCM, the future UCPA and a skiing and mountain guide instructor himself. When asked by Claude Dufourmantelle, he declined to participate in a rescue, but as a gesture he gave him his own ice axe to replace the one Claude lost when he fell in a crevasse at the Junction.
The EHM rescuers could be more willing, being military men they are guides and have no clients and no insurance problem… and can count on the French army organisation and its vast resources, but also with all its independence… Anyway Piraly and Burnet are adamant: good weather or not, avalanche risks are too high and one must first locate the missing climbers.
An Auster 5 pilot is available at Le Fayet tiny airstrip but he cannot take off until the runway is cleared from the snow. So no flight is possible that day.
Dufourmantelle whose partner, Caseneuve, has gone back to Paris cannot do anything on his own. He does not understand why no one in the Chamonix guides company wants to help. He therefore tries to find friends to form a rescue party. He also gives a call to Vincendon’s parents to warn them that their son may be in trouble.
Philippe Gaussot the Dauphiné Libéré's correspondent based in Chamonix writes his first article published the 27th and titled
« WITHOUT NEWS FROM THREE PARTIES WHO ATTEMPTED THE BRENVA SPUR. Among those, Bonatti, the Italian guide, Jean Vincendon from Paris and François Henry from Brussels… They are 24 hours late and the heavy snow fall recorded last night justifies the mountaineering community’s anxiety… Alert has been given by Claude Dufourmantelle…”
In the afternoon, le Duf finds two friends, François Aubert and Noel Blotti, who also wanted to do a winter ascent and are therefore equipped for it. They plan to get up to Tête Rousse from Les Houches the next day.
[YB] As per Yves Ballu's book.
 Air India Flight 245 (a lockeed L-749 Constellation) Malabar Princess with 40 passengers and 8 crew on the route Bombay-Istanbul-Geneva-London crashed into Mont Blanc on the morning of 3 November 1950, killing all on board (at the Rochers de la Tournette 4,677 m - near the summit of of Mont Blanc, on its South-West face Italian side; see above drawing "Route followed by Bonatti to Gonella"). Note that the route to Mont-Blanc by the Tournette spur from Quintino Sella is one of the least climbed of the easy routes to Mont-Blanc - AD - and so very worthwhile for those who want to avoid the crowds of the Gouter or three Mont Blanc routes.
 As per Claude Deck La Montagne et Alpinisme’s article.
8.3. Why not use an helicopter?
While Le Duf and his friends are progressing extremely slowly in deep snow towards the Nid d’Aigle, Dartigue has an idea that he had in his mind for some time: the use of a helicopter.[YB] On the initiative of Lucien Devies tests were done two years before with a Bell 47 which reached the altitude of 4500 m and made 11 runs. The pilot had even made two rescues, one on the Mer de Glace and another on the Argentière glacier, the first ones ever with a helicopter.
There were still some stringent technical limits, no horizontal flight a few meters from the ground and no stationary hovering. Those first tests were renewed successfully during the 2 following summers and with the approval from known alpinists and guides of whom Roger-Frison Roche, Maurice Herzog, Gaston Rébuffat, Louis Lachenal who accompanied flights. Armand Charlet had estimated that with a helicopter one could do as much work in half an hour than three rescue parties over two days.[YB] So, Dartigue asks the Haute-Savoie prefect for two reconnaissance helicopters, preferably Alouettes as he knows by repute those brand new turbine engine helicopters. He knows well about the tests and demonstrations made by the Sud-aviation test pilots particularly Jean Boulet who is alrfeady famous with many world records.
A year before Jean Boulet has flown with what will become the Alouette II at an altitude of 8209 m and in the summer 1956, while testing the Alouette in the mountains he rescued an alpinist by picking him up at the Vallot refuge. The Alouette with its turbine engine, a cockpit near the ground, two long skates ensuring stability on snow, a weight of 900 kilos is far better adapted to mountain flights than the heavy wheeled and piston engine Sikorsky helicopters (2,2 tons for the S55 and 3,5 tons for the S58 when empty). More, their flight ceiling is higher and they can make stationary and hovering flights.
Responding to Dartigue's demand, the Army decision is to send a Sikorsky S55 from Le Bourget Military Air base. The pilot is Sergeant Jacques Petetin, 25 years old, air school instructor. He climbed Mont-Blanc when he was 14 years old and knows well mountaineering and the area. His co-pilot is Lieutenant Dupret.
But he is well aware that “Happy elephant” - the nickname he gave to his Sikorsky - has an altitude ceiling of 3000 m, at 4000 m its 850 horse power engine loses up to 40% of its power. He also knows how to cheat in over-revving the engine which he did once to land a glaciologist on the Col du Dôme.
They also have their first unit of the new Sikorsky 58 with a 1600 horsepower engine, nicknamed “Mammoth”, but its maneuverability is none better. Its pilot Warrant-officer André Blanc, born in Algeria has never put a foot on a mountain.
Those heavy Helicopters have done a good job in the Indochina war but they are in no way adapted to flying in the mountains and there are only a handful of pilots in Europe who have any mountain flying experience with helicopters.At 1:15 pm, Petetin lands his S55 on Le Fayet tiny airstrip and takes on board Piraly, the St-Gervais guides’ company president. They take off but unfortunately the Grand Plateau is covered in clouds. Fifty minutes after they are back having seen nothing, but they know nearly for certain that Vincendon and Henry are not at Tête-Rousse, Le Gouter or Vallot. They have seen Dufourmantelle and his two companions near the Nid d’Aigle stopped by the heavy snow.
8.4. FIRST VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TWO CASTAWAYS.
At the same time, news come that two alpinists have been seen from Planpraz and the Brévent with a spy-glass, above and to the right of the Rochers Rouges, near the “forbidden passage”.
In fact only one clearly, the second maybe being hidden. Petetin refills partially his “Happy elephant’s” tank and takes off again but even guided from the Brévent where the observer continues to see clearly the alpinists, the clouds below prevent him and Piraly to see anything and they turn back. They fly back to their base in Le Bourget with a 150 m visibility with snow falling. Petetin flies just above the lorries’ lights on the main road to find his way. “A sodding day” for everyone including the parents of Vincendon who have arrived in Chamonix and are pestered by a flock of journalists arriving from Paris, Lyon, Grenoble… [YB]
Joseph Maffioli, guide and head of the Brévent ski patrolmen has observed clearly Vincendon and Henry moving first on the the 27th: instead of going to the Grand Plateau, as Dufourmantelle and Cazeneuve had done and where they could have reached easily the Grands Mulets, after a third bivouac near the bottom of the Upper Rochers Rouges, on the 28th they lost their way and instead of traversing the Grand Plateau following the route to the Grands Mulets, they went straight down to the extreme limit of the 300 m high ice-fall overhanging the Combe Maudite. They stopped on an unsteady cornice. They seemed too tired to climb back to the Grand Plateau. Trapped, they stay still.
The news reaches Chamonix that Bonatti and Gheser have arrived safely to Gonella. Everyone is now certain that the Mont-Blanc castaways are Jean Vincendon and François Henry. After separating
with the Italians, they went straight down for Chamonix and got lost.
On the 28th at noon, Piraly accompanying the Auster 5’s pilot and using binoculars sees Vincendon and Henry tracks and then guiding the pilot, the two climbers. On their return they have a meeting with Petetin who has flown to the Fayet airport with his “Happy elephant”. They know now that the two alpinists have not moved since the previous day and that they don’t seem to be able to climb back to the Grand Plateau.
The weather is now perfect and Petetin proposes a rescue with his “Happy elephant”: landing near the two climbers, take them on board and back to Le Fayet. Piraly takes a 20 m rope and with Petetin they take off. However after passing a few meters aside the two castaways, Petetin realizes that he cannot land, the snow on the glacier is much too deep, there are crevasses and furthermore the slope is too steep; once on the snow his helicopter would sink in and topple over. He could stop much higher on the Dôme du Gouter but who would take the two castaways up? Piraly alone cannot do it. Get down with a rope ladder? Impossible, The S55 at this altitude cannot make a stationary hover; like a bicycle, it cannot hold without moving.
Petetin went so near that he saw clearly the smiling faces of Vincendon and Henry. Later he will say:
“How sad to know, feel, listen in my head and my heart, those two boys of the same age than I dying, there, and unable to do more…”[YB]
At 3:30 pm he takes off again and drops backpacks with blankets, food, drugs and five identical messages attached to smoke grenades:
“GO UP IMMEDIATELY 200 M TO THE GRAND PLATEAU. It is the only place where the helicopter will be able to land and take you.”
Piraly takes a photo with one the two castaways standing and the second in a coiled position which will be published by the newspapers
17] The « forbidden passage » is the « old passage” or “passage Balmat”, forbidden by the Chamonix guides company après the 13th October 1866 Arkwright accident. The guides then were going up the Corridor and the Mur de la Côte, and also the Bosses ridge route which progressively will be more and more used.
Vincendon and Henry will not be able to open the rucksacks, their hands are frozen hard but they got one of the messages and at 4 pm they start moving up, but extremely slowly. At 5:20 pm they have climbed 50 metres. It is too late for the S55 to take off again. Piraly who has been the most active of the guides - and the only one up to then - calls the press to explain his plan. Tomorrow he will attempt to persuade Vincendon and Henry to go further up near the Dôme du Gouter where he could get out of the helicopter with a rope ladder and then clip them on a rope to help them get in the helicopter. If landing on the Grand Plateau is impossible then he could be dropped on the Dôme du Gouter with several other guides to prepare a landing ground for the helicopter. If the weather is fine, Saturday night, for the first time in seven days, they could sleep in a bed.
But Piraly has no guide available so he asks his Chamonix equivalent, Joseph Burnet, who refuses categorically to ask any of his Chamonix guides to take what he considers to be too high a risk, but he suggests to contact Lionel Terray who is not in Chamonix. Piraly needs at least six guides so with no volunteer his rescue plan by the Col du Dôme is at a standstill.
Meanwhile Claude Dufourmantelle and his friends François Aubert and Noel Blotti due to the deep snow have come down from their attempt to reach the Dôme du Gouter. Blotti has twisted an ankle and will not be available any longer. Claude now wants to go up to the Grands Mulets. He finds some more friends, of whom besides François Aubert, Remy de Vivie, Marcel Bize and the Swiss, Marcel Bron, Roger Habersaat, Claudi Asper and Mario Grossi, all experienced alpinists from the Androsace (famous alpinists club of Geneva) but they only have their skiing equipment. He asks Dartigue the SCSM president to lend him some equipment. Joseph Burnet refusing, Dartigue calls the FFM in Paris, but it will arrive far too late!
8.5. THE EHM MOVES IN
Gilbert Chappaz is one of the EHM ski and guide instructors and also a member of the Chamonix guides company. Hearing about the Piraly rescue operation he goes to Le Fayet to meet Piraly and volunteers, but he must get the approval of the major in charge of the EHM, Yves Le Gall.
At 44, Le Gall recently back from the Indochina war has taken charge of the EHM. A military man, he has no experience in mountaineering. Dartigue is all too glad to give all the rescue authority and responsibilities to Yves Le Gall.[YB] The decision is taken, Le Gall will be in charge of all operations. The helicopter operation proposed by Piraly is accepted, but at the same time Le Gall excludes any on foot rescue party, against all current practices. However Petetin knows from experience that the Sikorsky cannot make a stationary flight which is necessary to get the castaways from a rope ladder into the helicopter, and the Alouettes can, as Dartigue also had suggested.
Unfortunately the Army and Air Force authorities have decided otherwise in sending the Sikorsky helicopters based nearby (Le Bourget).
9. LE GALL TAKES OVER
DAY 8 - Saturday (29th)
Major Le Gall now in charge.
Le Gall changes Piraly’s plan with the agreement of Nollet, the Colonel in charge of the Air Force in Le Bourget air base and Colonel Lacroix in charge of the helicopter section. He will allocate twelve EHM guides organised in two rescue parties to be landed on the Dôme du Gouter, seven hours to reach the castaways and bring them up to the Col du Dôme, so he needs a second helicopter. Nollet and Lacroix allocate the Sikorsky S58 with his helicopter section commander, Major Santini. Santini hesitates as his S58 has never been tested in the mountains and on snow, but his commanding officers insist and he takes off with a mechanic and a pilot, Warrant officer André Blanc, landing at Le Fayet à 4 pm. As Le Gall operation will require 7 hours in total, he will only give the green light with a complete day of good weather and acceptable flight conditions. He does not want to act by steps, even if he is told that Vallot could be used as a base by the rescuers. He is using the same tactics as in the Indochina war to retrieve wounded from the field.
He also excludes any other rescuers than the EHM guides, particularly civilians; he only wants military men.
In the morning, the airstrip is covered in clouds, the helicopters cannot take off. Early afternoon the weather clears up.
Piraly is ready to take off with Petetin and his “Happy Elephant”, but to his surprise, a large amount of equipment is loaded on board and he is told that Le Gall is taking his place, his mountaineering and rescue experience brushed away. They take off. Soon after they see Vincendon and Henry, still progressing towards the Grand Plateau. They see the hole in which they have bivouacked the previous night and the rucksacks dropped the day before are not on the slope so they believe that they have taken them. They drop food, clothes and stoves 5 m from Vincendon, the second load is dropped 10 m from Henry. They saw them seize the loads and wave their arms to them.
Chances to save Vincendon and Henry seem high that night. The journalist Philippe Gaussot writes in Le Dauphiné:“All this should allow them to hold another 24 hours and even without being over optimistic, 3 or 4 days.”
Santini who just landed with his S58 is confident that tomorrow he will get them safely if the weather conditions are fine.
Dufourmantelle asks Le Gall if he could be dropped with two or three of his friends who would jump out of the helicopter near Vincendon and Henry with the intention to get them down to the Grands Mulets.
Le Gall refuses. As a military commander he could not have “amateurs” and be responsible for their safety.
10. TERRAY’S RESCUE PARTY
LIONEL TERRAY GETS INVOLVED - DAY 9 - Sunday (30th)
Lionel Terray, one of the two or three “non-locals” members of the Chamonix guides company, is highly respected as a guide and also for his drive on the Annapurna first ascent and his many successful mountain rescues.
On his way back to Chamonix by car after having given a conference in Val d’Isère, he picks up a hitch-hiker, Bob Xueref, a climbing friend of Jean Vincendon coming from Lyon where he had learned the news.
They meet Dufourmantelle who gives them the latest news. Terray is indignant, the Chamonix guides have refused to organize a rescue.
He meets Vincendon’s parents and then several EHM monitors. Their conversation turn foul. Terray does not understand why they have not organised a rescue party on foot and he is told that they do not need him.
Le Gall will not change his plan for Terray who had proposed to be dropped with Dufourmantelle on the Col du Dôme and excludes firmly their participation. He describes his plan which Terray disapproves telling him that he will then organise an on foot rescue operation on his own.
Later Terray will be asked to explain the use of the oxygen systems which the EHM rescuers will take with them.
At 9 am, Santini, André Blanc and a EHM monitor take off with the S 58 for a reconnaissance flight as planned, their first time in altitude and in the mountains. At altitude, the weather conditions are not good and the wind is strong. During a hovering test, the S58 stalls. Above 1800 m visibility is nil, says Santini. The weather worsens and the whole day will be lost.
Furious, Terray believes that too much time has been lost with the helicopters which are inefficient in poor weather conditions while the traditional rescuing on foot is always possible. He organises a first rescue party with Claude Dufourmantelle, Remy de Vivie, François Aubert and his friend, an ENSA teacher, Hubert Josserand - the only guide from the ENSA who will volunteer.
One must also note that if Louis Lachenal, Terray’s best friend and climbing partner is not mentioned in the drama it is because one year before he fell to his death in a crevasse in the Vallée Blanche.
Terray asks Bob Xueref to stay behind in order to get the necessary equipment for the second team, the Swiss Marcel Bron and his friends from the Androsace who only had their skiing equipment; they will catch them up the following day at the Grands Mulets, following his party’s tracks.
The first rescue party starts, taking the new Aiguille du Midi cable-car to the Plan de l’Aiguille - The cable-car company refused them to use the service platform of the Aiguille des Glaciers which could have saved them 3 to 4 hours and that will prevent them to sleep at The Grands Mulets that day.
With the disapproval of the Chamonix guides, the refusal of the SCSM to cover their insurance (which Lucien Devies, president of the FFM will act upon immediately when alerted, ordering Dartigue to cover it), he wonders if they all want to prevent him to save the two castaways! They will all sleep in the remains of the top station of the Glaciers old cable-car.
11. THE CRASH
DAY 10 - Monday (31th)
11.1. The S58 crash.
The second rescue party, finally equipped by the EHM (including a heavy transmitting set), starts on Terray’s team tracks.
They also lose half a day to traverse from the new to the old cable-car, its managers refusing again to start up the service platform of the old one.
At Le Fayet small airstrip, Le Gall' EHM teams are ready, but the two Sikorsky need more preparation time. At 9 am, Santini and Blanc take off with their S58 taking a guide with them, Honoré Bonnet (future coach of the highly successful French skiing team winning more than 32 Olympic medals over a period of 10 years). Normally this is a weather conditions reconnaissance, but eventually something could be attempted. The wind is much too strong and half-an hour later they are back to Le Fayet.
Night falls at 5 pm, the operation needs 7 hours, if Le Gall cannot give the go ahead at 10, another day will be lost. At noon, the weather is fine, but the EHM guides will not be in situ before another hour and they won’t end their operation before 7 pm, too late for the helicopters to fly. Terray’s team is getting off the Junction, at best they will sleep at the Grands Mulets, but will not be in time to reach the Grand Plateau.
Vincendon and Henry are doomed!
Then, from the Brévent comes the news: one of the two castaways is moving. One is still alive.
As will state Petetin years later, Santini the Corsican, veteran of the Indochina war, irritated and pissed off by the pressure of his commanding officers and the Air minister who are on the airstrip, knowing that their chances to succeed are low still decides to have a go. He will attempt a direct rescue i.e. on the Grand Plateau. Petetin will add: “this affair was really not his cup of tea!”Petetin advises him to get equipped for it. But the Corsican replies that he does not intent to stay up there! With Blanc as pilot and himself as the co-pilot they will attempt to stabilize the helicopter while the guides will get Vincendon and Henry into the helicopter. Finally Petetin persuades Santini and Blanc to put on mountain boots, a fur flying suit and to take a pair of gloves.
11.2. Petetin drops 4 guides on the Dôme du Gouter.
Nollet, the Le Bourget military air base commander asks Petetin (flying with Lieutenant Dupret) to take off and to get the men out in three or four successive flights.
Petetin refuses, he knows that the only place he can land safely is the Dôme du Gouter which he has done the previous year, a place where visibility is always better and winds more regular.
Decision is taken to drop four guides on the Dôme du Gouter to save first the two pilots and then Vincendon and Henry.
Petetin lands safely on the Dôme du Gouter dropping Gilbert Chappaz; another flight and he drops Jean Minster with some equipment.
Two more flights and they are now four on the Dôme du Gouter. The guides decide that Chappaz and Minster will go to the Grand Plateau whilst the other two go to Vallot where they will all regroup.
Petetin last flight was quite risky - he had to make three attempts before being able to take off from the Dôme du Gouter - and he announces that it is the last one for the day. As he stated “I was not flying a helicopter, but a plane!” (his engine filter had frozen) . But the mission is accomplished.
11.3. Bonnet’s attempt to reach Vallot.
Meanwhile Honoré Bonnet decides to get the two pilots who have no mountaineering experience up to Vallot and then come back to help out Vincendon and Henry who are heavily frostbitten: their hands and feet are blocks of wood. They do not realize how badly they are frostbitten. They have not been able to use any of the equipment and food dropped the previous days, but they are able to dialogue with Bonnet. Learning that Bonnet is a member of the GHM which they dream to join, they evoke climbs they could do together in the near future, the memory of which, years after, will make Bonnet cry! François Henry looks in a better condition than Jean who says that without François he would not be alive.
They stay two hours together, Bonnet gives them an injection of Benzedrine. At 3 pm, the two guides leave with the two pilots, once again Vincendon and Henry are on their own.
They haven’t done 30 m that André Blanc falls into a crevasse stopped at the surface by his arms. A snow bridge has broken under his 90 kilos. Shocked by having crashed his S58, feeling a deep sense of guilt, he gives way and slides down two meters into the crevasse. Bonnet blocks him on the rope, and on his belly comes up to the brim of the hole, telling Blanc that he will send him a loop and to put his foot onto it to get up and out. But Blanc does not understand, he has gone berserk, he sees himself dying and has no reaction.
With Germain and the usage of a haul system, Bonnet finally manages to grasp the warrant officer and gets him out.
Blanc is unable to move further, a real drip. Bonnet drags him to the crashed helicopter and puts him besides Vincendon and Henry who encourages him and tries to warm his hands with his own, hard as rocks, a sight which made Bonnet cry.
Later when in hospital, Blanc will tell François’s father what his son told him, how after they separated from Bonatti, they got lost at the Rochers Rouges, Vincendon slipped down a couloir taking him along in a fall over 60 m, losing their gloves, their glacier goggles, their rucksacks and for François his crampons and his over boots. After their fall, they bivouacked again at the bottom of the Upper Red Rocks. The next day, they lost their way, missing the Grand Plateau and ending above the icefall of the Combe Maudite. Then on Saturday or Sunday François managed to drag Vincendon back onto the Grand Plateau. He also told him that François did not cease to take care of him trying to warm him up with his hands hard as wood.[YB]
Jean Minster and Gilbert Chappaz arrive on the spot and evaluate the situation: The two castaways are in a desperate state. Theirs legs are frozen high up, they are unable to use their hands, frozen up to their elbows, and they still do not seem to realize the dreadful state they are in. They look happy, dreaming, apologizing for the trouble they are causing and telling the EHM guides that they will help them in future rescues.
Bruised badly during the crash, Germain is not in a good shape, and Blanc is shocked, arms and hands paralyzed. Minster gives him some Coramine and Piridiline. The four EHM guides consider three options:
- stay put and wait for reinforcements;
- make two teams, one taking the pilots to Vallot and the second staying with Vincendon and Henry;
- get the pilots to Vallot and leave Vincendon and Henry and come back the following day with reinforcements.
As Le Duf will say when interviewed more than 50 years later in Denis Ducroz's film (see link):
"Those boys during 10 days bivouacked without drinking, without eating, without gloves, without their glacier sunglasses and they were still found alive, able to speak, to apologize for the trouble they were causing. It is... They have been abandoned... they went through hell, a true way of the cross… and it overwhelmed the whole of France and it is still as overwhelming.”
Bonnet and Germain leave first with Santini, Minster and Chappaz follow with Blanc. Night is on them, snow starts falling and a North-West wind has risen. Blanc is suffering and toiling painfully the two guides after 8 hours of effort manage to reach Vallot at 1:30 am, Blanc has to be carried with the help of the two other EHM guides at Vallot in a weather which did not cease to deteriorate.
The first party, Germain-Bonnet-Santini, has not reached Vallot. Forced by the storm with no visibility, a compass going berserk, afraid to lose themselves, they stopped at 11:30 pm and bivouacked in the bergschrund below Vallot protecting Santini from the cold as much as they could.
11.4. Le Duf and Terray’s party nearing the Grands Mulets“The helicopter fell down”, but they understand “they fell down” i.e. the two castaways!They turn back and meet the second party which had bivouacked 200 m below and learned from Marcel Bron who had a radio link with Le Gall that it was the S58 which had crashed.
Terray decides to go down and this time Le Gall will obtain for his two parties that they use the Glacier cable-car platform!
Their descent is very difficult in this heavy snow.
When in Chamonix, Terray will be very critical with the whole rescue organisation.
The Dauphiné Libéré publishes the reactions of the Chamonix guides, accusing Terray to have organized a rescue with “amateurs”, stating that the dangers were too great and that he was after personal publicity.
This pushed Terray to react even more strongly.
He will state to the journalists that too much time had been lost, they could have reached the two castaways two days before without any problem.
“I accuse those who stated that the route to get to the Mont-Blanc castaways was inaccessible to have stood still in the valley, their arms crossed, without trying to know if their opinion was proved valid.”
“I find normal that many guides manifested no enthusiasm to risk their lives, but what I do not admit, is that many prevented the volunteers to act.”
As Le Duf will state years after, “An on foot rescue party should have been decided immediately from the start as in all instances it would have reached them. That Le Gall decided not to was probably to limit the risks, but in difficult conditions there is no rescue possible without the commitment of the rescuers and a risk that they accept…”
Adding that "as the Chamonix guides had decided from the start not to go, telling him that as it was the best of the skiing season most guides were busy giving skiing lessons so had no time available and that once that decision taken, they persevered stubbornly with their attitude not to go", and about Lionel Terray:
“Apart from having been one of the greatest French guide, he has also been one of the greatest French climbing amateur, he was an ideal link between the two worlds, because he was an expedition man and he did not have to give skiing lessons, he never was a basic guide and so his position was more comfortable than his Chamonix guides comrades who were just doing their job, and Lionel had no kid, one often forget to mention it… He liked this type of climbing so he belonged at the same time to our world and to theirs.”
Lionel Terray had been already highly criticized by the Chamonix guides company representatives when in September 1955 he participated in a rescue of Philippe Cornuau and Maurice Davaille doing the first ascent of the Droites North face (the most difficult ice climb done then).
The rescue was triggered by the Sennelier brothers, two of the best Fontainebleau climbers then doing their aspirant-guides course. Threatened to be expelled from their course if they left it to go on the rescue, they flatly replied they did not give a damn and seeked the participation of Fontainebleau friends such as Lucien Bérardini.
The EHM did participate in the party led by Terray of whom Gilles Chappaz, Honoré Bonnet (who will do their best in trying to rescue Vincendon & Henry) and Charles Bozon. On second thoughts, The ENSA manager, who had initially refused, authorized his instructors to participate as a second party which reached the Couvercle refuge.
After 6 bivouacs, Cornuau and Davaille found their "rescuers" on the summit. They were in need of no help but were glad to be offered something to eat before getting down. Finally as the Sennelier brothers were the best of their training group and with the back up of a number of climbers, of whom Lionel Terray, they were given their diploma, ranking N°1 and N°2.
As an example of the then difficult relationship between the professional guides and the adventurous amateurs, at the end of the summer 1957 (September 11), 9 months after the Vincendon & Henry drama, Maurice Davaille was climbing The Major route in the wake of 6 aspirant-guides and their two instructors, the last route of their training course (Claude Dufourmantelle had climbed it with Claude Jaccoux a few days before and they had told their friends in the aspirant-guides course that the conditions were perfect, pushing the ENSA instructors to climb it instead of the easier Brenva spur planned by Armand Charlet). Near the top, at 6 am, a devastating storm fell on them. Having climbed the last rock difficulty, the "impassable corner", Guy Martin-Ravel, the last of the aspirant-guides, recalls that he saw Davaille with some blood spread over his face and his partner asking if there were pegs in the corner. Martin-Ravel wanted to throw him a rope but his two instructors told him " No way, let him fend himself. Leave him the pegs, we must get out as fast as we can..." and they pulled his rope tight; with no harness it choked him and prevented his resistance. Regrouping in a furious wind below the col Major, Guy Martin wrote "one of our instructors exclaimed triumphantly: Davaille, he is done... Bonatti also [Bonatti was climbing La Poire] but we are going to get away, give or take an hour...". They reached Chamonix in the evening. Davaille and his partner, probably blown down the Italian side by the furious wind, will never be seen again, but a few days after, Davaille's ice axe will be found on the Col Major. Guy Martin-Ravel will keep up to his last day the memory of Maurice Davaille's "weary eyes in the thick mist and biting snow flakes looking at me awaiting for a helping hand. To no avail." [19 bis] Those days in Chamonix, the Spirit of mountaineering was not a shared value between the amateurs and the guides, by far!
As for Terray, despite the support of Armand Charlet, the Chamonix guides company representatives demand excuses or his resignation.
12.3. THE EHM GUIDES RESCUE
At Vallot, the EHM guides have organised themselves and take care of Blanc who is in a particularly bad state.
The weather is unstable during two days. No helicopter operation is possible.
At last, Sergeant Petetin telling colonel Nollet, his commanding officer, that his S55 will not be able to get them off, decision is taken to use the Alouettes (The French Air Force has a dozen of brand new ones, delivered in October last, based in the Pyrenees - Mont-de-Marsan).
And better, the Sud-Aviation CEO accepts to lend his two test pilots, Jean Boulet and Gérard Henry, the only two pilots with mountain and altitude flying experience with those new helicopters.
Meanwhile Petetin will make one attempt to land his S55 near Vallot to no avail. Coming back up alone without Dupret to save weight, Santini who had observed his first attempt asked by radio colonel Nollet to stop Petetin trying a second time : "He is going to break his neck!"
At the end of the afternoon, two Alouettes land at Chamonix under a clear sky unlike in Le Fayet.
The weather prevent them to fly again.
Priority is given to the rescuers at Vallot.
 As per Secours Extrême - J.R. Belliard - R.Romet - Flammarion 1986
13. THE ALOUETTES DO THE JOB
Before the two Alouettes take off, the Auster 5 pilot has flown over the S58 crashed and sees it nearly fully covered in snow and no sign of life.
The first Alouette takes off at 9 am and lands on the Vallot spot prepared by the EHM guides. Santini gets in and the pilot lands him near the Chamonix hospital, followed quickly by the second Alouette with Blanc on board, carried to the hospital.
In a succession of flights, the two Alouettes will evacuate successfully everyone from Vallot.
In 1h30 the whole Vallot evacuation operation is accomplished.
The press will be unanimous to celebrate the feat of the Alouettes.
But what about the two castaways?
Vincendon and Henry' parents do not understand why the third part of Le Gall’s plan - dropping a caravan of 30 men on the Dôme du Gouter to rescue Vincendon and Henry - does not start. Why so many? Why not send just 4?
Chappaz asks Le Gall permission to go back to get them with his fellow EHM rescuers or at least to see if they are still alive even if they know that chances are now probably nil. The military will not risk another failure. Le Gall and his commanding officers will not authorize their EHM guides to go back down to Vincendon and Henry.
They have reported that Vincendon and Henry physical condition was desperate.
Le Gall explains that situation to Henry’s father who has always been on Le Gall’s authority’s side and he accepts that the two boys cannot be saved any longer. Vincendon’s parents, stunned will learn about the decision the following morning.
Jean Boulet proposes a last attempt: the snow being too deep to land, he would keep his Alouette hovering above the ground while a unique rescuer would go down using a rope ladder, evaluate the state of the two castaways and eventually clip them on the rope. Le Gall decides to get in with Petetin. For him it is a last inspection flight to “see and decide”.
Boulet takes off at 10h50, followed closely by the second Alouette - pilot Gérard Henry - with colonel Nollet on board. Boulet hovers over the Crashed S58, a whirlwind of powdery snow envelops the crashed S58. The three men look closely but no one shows up, they see no sign of life. Persuaded that Vincendon and Henry are dead or living their last moments, they fly away..
Geiger will propose a landing on the Grand Plateau with a guide. Piraly volunteers. But it is too late, no one believes any more that they are still alive.
Le Gall announces the end of all operations.
Terray will have some strong words against Le Gall:
“He went without any special equipment… and without leaving his seat he declared without any proof… that the two boys were dead.”
All rescue operations are stopped without being certain that Vincendon and Henry are dead!
 Winching up into a helicopter will only occur in 1971.
The fever gone, the backlash of the drama which has been watched every day by the Chamonix inhabitants, the many skiers and the French public at large through the daily news published by the press and the radio daily coverage will not cease for a very long time.
Lucien Devies the FFM president attempts an action to pacify the situation in proposing a joint action involving all parties to get Vincendon & Henry’ bodies down, but it fails due to the local
The bodies of Jean Vincendon and François Henry will be brought back to Chamonix by an Alouette the following March, but not without a strong reaction of Vincendon’s parents contacted by the FFM:
“Remy de Vivie, friend of my son, tells me that the French Alpine Club has taken the initiative to organise a party to get down my son and François Henry’ bodies. This party of alpinists from Paris would include several Chamonix guides. During the agony of the two boys, they refused their help - it was their right - now they must stay with their feet in their slippers.”[YB]
The Chamonix guides highly criticized for having refused to participate in the rescue form a jury in order to claim justice for Terray’s criticisms. The Army feels also to have been defamed.
Armand Charlet, quite absent up to now in the drama will defend Terray and explain that being 60, he is not fit anymore for such rescues, if not he would have gone with Terray. It is still a pity that
such a figure respected by all mountaineers did not attempt to persuade his fellow Chamonix guides to participate in the rescue. During the winter 1938 he had led the parties (from Chamonix and Geneva) which saved the famous Swiss guide, Raymond Lambert, his young pal Marcel Gallay (an aspirant-guide as Vincendon) and his client Erika Stagni. Some will say that most of the Chamonix
guides joined the rescue team organised by Charlet because the very rich Erika’s mother promised them double pay taking charge on top of their insurance and all costs due to potential physical damages, which did occur (4 guides had toes amputated - see my article on Summitpost: A Tragic Adventure On Mont-Blanc
Terray will rapidly accept to take back his resignation from the Chamonix guides Company, in exchange his exclusion is cancelled.
As for the representatives of the Chamonix guides company they continued in their stubborn attitude in stating to the press that
“…Those who by vanity attempt climbs beyond their capabilities… dismiss easily the risks taken by their rescuers. We assert that Vincendon and Henry have voluntarily put themselves in that exceptional situation… One cannot expose with certainty the life of 10 to 15 rescuers, even to rescue two men.”
For the high command of the French Army, enough has been done, they evaluate the rescue to the equivalent of 3 million euros of today's currency and state that for two imprudent young men the loss of an S58 will impact the training of their pilots, essential for the Algerian “peace keeping” operation. An opinion shared by many, but not by The FFM and Lucien Devies whose committee will declare that
“rescuing our fellow human beings in distress is a human duty, even if risks have to be taken”
and among known personalities questioned by the press for their view, Georges Carpentier, the French boxing world champion stated:
“Everything had to be attempted, even beyond reason, even if it was a folly. Two men have risked their life for something difficult and noble. Taking risks to save them was paying tribute to their courage and guts.”[YB]
The SCSM and the military commands will ask Lucien Devies as president of the FFM to take position in the controversy.
Very quickly after the end of the rescue operations (10th of January 1957), Lucien Devies announces that the FFM will recommend measures based on the drama’s analysis, “first major rescue failure since the end of the war”, particularly “in the region where the largest number of personnel and equipment exist…”
The FFM analysis of the rescue, taking into account all the misfortunes encountered showed important weaknesses in the plan of actions:
- Solidarity which was at the base of the organisation was ignored. The most prestigious guides company had refused to participate in the rescue.
- The unacceptable was pointed out clearly with the strong words of Lionel Terray: “I find normal that many guides manifested no enthusiasm to risk their lives, but what I do not admit, is that many prevented the volunteers to act.”
- The method used by the institution in charge of executing the rescue had gone astray of all methods and techniques duly validated. Helicopters had not yet proven that they could be used in mountain rescue and a number of those helicopters did not have the capabilities for it and the pilots had no experience nor the equipment adequate for this type of operation [this was not true of the S55 pilot, Petetin and the Alouettes’ pilots, Jean Boulet and Gérard Henry]
- The SCSM showed itself to be deaf and blind - and was kept out of things by the unit in charge of the execution, which itself was left totally free in its wanderings.
- Delays and serious confusions appeared in the decisions.
- The absence of on foot rescue parties - solely due to the stubbornness of some - was highly criticized, it most certainly caused the death of the two boys.
- Finally a federal committee which was never informed and was totally deprived of its capabilities.
Several months later the main lines of what will become the national organisation of mountain rescue are defined by Lucien Devies and his FFM committee.
In August 1958, a new regulation is decreed: the rescue system becomes a national service reporting to the interior ministry and most significantly new rescue units will be formed by the CRS, the
Gendarmerie and the Army. In 1961, a special unit of the Gendarmerie nationale, the GSHM is created which will become the highly efficient PGHM mountain rescue unit. They will train highly efficient rescuers and progressively will take over all mountain rescues from the volunteers associations.
The usage of helicopters will change dramatically mountain rescue, but it is not before much later, in 1972, when the PGHM will take over all mountain rescues that the controversies with the Chamonix guides involvement in critical rescues will cease (see my Summitpost article on the 1966 Drus rescue: The 1966 Drus Rescue..
Lucien Devies will do much to stop the controversies which followed the drama. As an example he refused to publish any article on the drama in La Montagne et Alpinisme, the French Alpine Club magazine which he presided. It is only in 1983, 3 years after Devies's death that my friend Claude Deck was allowed to publish the first detailed article 14 years before Yves Ballu's book. Claude had worked for many years with Lucien Devies who had asked him to take his place in writing La Montagne et Alpinisme’s alpine chronicle which he did for 40 years, up to last year.
 Fédération Française de la Montagne prime authority for organising mountain rescue.
In June 2007, 50 years after the event, Yves Ballu organised a meeting at the Chamonix cemetery between them and Jean Henry, the older brother and a climbing companion of François Henry.
Gilbert Chappaz in private will tell Jean Henry:
“If you knew all the miseries we suffered… I went last and I told him [François Henry] I will come back to get you. ”
Just after the end of the rescue operation, Chappaz had said to a journalist:
“In leaving them there, I had the feeling of committing a crime.”
During 50 years Gilbert Chappaz was haunted by the fact that he did not fulfil his promise and that François Henry died despising him.
Jean Henry told him gently that he didn’t have to excuse himself,
“…by going there you showed them that they had not been abandoned…”
As stated one of Chappaz’s sons:
“it was as if suddenly my father had taken off a rucksack filled with a huge rock. All at once he stood straighter.”
Gilbert Chappaz died five months after, relieved and in peace.
 Yves Ballu Blog Vincendon and Henry - Epilogue
An afterword, which sounds very much like a foreword. Indeed a last word. By Claude Dufourmantelle
It may have been like this, it must have been like this, it should have been like this. Nowadays, these triangles – some say trilemme - are fashionable.
It means that a recollection, a recall, a souvenir is constantly reconstructed in your silly mind by futile attempts at remembering what you actually did, what actually happened and comparing the outcome to what could have happened if or to what you should have done to… to what? To change the past? To explain the past? To draw conclusion from the past or simply to exonerate you from the past.
Iam tempted to let the past rest which is what it does best.
Some people seem to be past-bound. They built a special relationship with things that deflected the course of their lives. Hence the very French “Faire son deuil” which, to me appears like a Cillitbang spray applied on a wound. Something bad which happened must be kept in full view and made a good usage of to enhance how miserable your life has become and if you can ascribe a responsibility somewhere else, it is all benefit.
Someothers are different: they think that the best alleviation is to forget.
I am very good at that.
As a young man and for quite some time, climbing mountains was very important forme. I believe that a newcomer in a society, in our society has to display or should wish to display a certain warrior hue, an achievement of a sort which opens the doors of the adult world.
The generations that have lived through the Great Wars did not have to look far to find out the field of these necessary baptisms. It was provided free and the matter was ample.
Their followers had to resort to sports, preferably the very virile ones and in my humble view Mountaineering comes first. Mountaineering, the French call it Alpinism, covers everything: adventure which you seasoned up to you taste. It requires skill and becomes some sort of a trade and for the gifted ones it can flash the narcissist feeling of just how elegant you are on the rock.
Those years. How lucky we were, Xavier and I, two students sitting on the same bench,with the same timetable, the same ample vacations, the same appetite for the same mountains, with no strings attached, no real money problem, full acceptance by the fathers and a very faithful and dependable 2CV Citroen.
Yearsof alpine freedom, four months each year: we were unbelievably lucky and we knew our luck.
We climbed mostly in Dauphiné, collecting second ascents that had been neglected by the afterwar Great Guides, who were too busy democratizing the Walker spur,and we added an exotic touch of Pyrénées. We felt like the Thoreaus of amicable and benevolent mountains.
We were confident but respectful and quite aware of our limitations. For us mountaineering remained (and still remains) what I believe it should be: the adventure that you cut to your size and to the time you live in.
So we had been up a certain number of things but never on Mont Blanc.
Our dignity implied both Italy and winter but, as I say, cut to the right size.Hence the Brenva spur.
The 1955 X’mas climb with our friend André was a very pleasant trip up from Chamonix along the Brévent railway track up to the Torino hut across a multitude of crevasses with a very persistent and not so pleasant snowfall. Fun but no attempt and no summit gratification. Two conclusions were drawn from the experiment: first, never ski down roped up with André and second you need more time so as to catch the right weather window.
Then came the full moon concept: climbing up the east side of the mountain and climbing down the west side gave the shrewd climber full time-wise autonomy and no problem of night or day choice; you could choose to do your stuff by day or by night…
Andflexibility is sister of velocity.
We wanted it to be a fast one, a one shot thing. Light: a sleeping bag and an extra pied d’éléphant, a half a litre of alcohol and the compulsory Gédéon*, and some titbits, for what could not last more than a dozen hours. Adequately Fate instructed that we took an extra 30 m rope, just in case: we had it and I am in a position to re-imagine those days and talk about them. Without these 30 m of nylon I would be scattered in the debris of the Bossons glacier past any forensic identification.
Thefull moon ploy had another consequence: it gave the date of the ascent,December 17th and 18th.
How did we manage to get a week out of school? Here again let the matter rest lest some forgery be disclosed.
Vincendon who had more or less been led to think that he could come along with us was unable to make it. Xavier was adamant and did not want anybody dragging along,so that was fine. And fine with me: we knew what we were up to and we did not wish to run a test with any other team.
The fact is that Vincendon was no friend of mine. I knew him and never had any close relationship with him. It was through casual encounters after casual Club Alpin Thursday night meeting that he knew of our intentions. Casually.
When I had to begin asking and even begging for rescue I endorsed a temporary friendship which ever since has been taken for granted but which never really existed. But not to be a close friend to a fellow climber or to anybody is no good reason to let the chap freeze to death on the mountain.
Andthis I believe is the entire philosophy of the “Affaire V et H”.
The story of our ascent is of little interest. It went smoothly and despite a rather deep snow trail in the lower half it went fast. One short day to reach the small hut of La Fourche. One full day to climb the spur, which says the chronicle we reached at sunset. My only recollection is of a couple of pitches on a rather steep ice wall which to our satisfaction was illustrated by an accommodating crack, almost a chimney. That piece of cake –practically no sérac- rapidly swallowed and crossing the 4.300 m barrier we were very happy to glide down the corridor, catching breath and dissipating the hard-won altitude. I remember clearly, of all things, at the top of the Grands Mulets ridge a tiny cove, pure ice, glistening under the enormous moon, calling for a well-earned bivouac. Xavier would have none of it and he was right. So we glided on. It is strange that such a fugitive instant should have stuck to me while so many important parts of the drama went unrecorded. We are strange machines.
How did I get out of the crevasse I fell in the following day: pure miracle? Just about the same scenario that Bonatti wrote a few days later. It is of little interest in the V and H story. But it had a major impact in the pursuance of my climber’s expertise. I became manic on the matter of adequate rope length and no slack – not even a little bit - on a snow covered glacier. And believe me, for a guide, this is not always easy to get from all the people you ferry across the normal routes up the normal mountains.
Back to Chamonix, we had dinner with Jean Vincendon and François Henry.
Henry,we had never met and I did not see him again. Nor Vincendon.
Xavier left Chamonix and went back to his Xmas family gathering.
Three days later I uncorked the Pandora amphora and set to motion what became really the “Affaire”.
Everything has been told, retold, analyzed, criticized, printed, photographed, filmed,radioed and televisionized. The one place where a trace cannot be found, apiece of evidence discovered is on the blank sheet of my memory. All I know is what I have read afterwards and the answers I gave reluctantly to the news men at times when, maybe, I still had some recollections.
One last flash: I am leading the rescue party up the Grands Mulets route. The weather is fine, we are making good progress and Lionel is just behind me. A kick turn and between my two skis a deep blue deep hole. Hell without flame. I don’t move and a tiny plane flies right over us. A shout: “Ils sont tombés. ”In my mind a shutter falls. I undo my kick turn and I am no longer on the mountain. I am back in Paris where the family waits for me.
I have done what I could. I could probably have done more. Most people did less.
From that instant, the plane on its low altitude passage extended a veil of oblivion over me and these events.
That’s the way I am built.
The veil of forgiveness was extended later. Indulgence and pardon are not young men inclinations.
But then, much later, I came to realize that Fate had been the main actor, if not the only actor in this tragedy.
*The Gédéon: such was the name the Parisian climbers gave to the two conical piecesof the aluminum stove they used in these pre-gas canister eras. The explosiveprimus gasoline stove was only for longer stays in safer places.
Claude Dufourmantelle, June 2017
Yves Ballu Naufrage au Mont-Blanc l’affaire Vincendon et Henry, Guerin éditions Paulsen 2017
Claude Deck, Previous GHM president and La Montagne et Alpinisme MD - La Montagne et Alpinisme 3/1983
Claude Deck Lucien DEVIES – La montagne pour vocation - L’organisation du secours en montagne (l’Harmattan)
Walter Bonatti - Montagnes d'une vie, Arthaud 2012
Walter Bonatti Una Vita cosi a cura di Angelo Ponta RCS Libri, Milano 2014 (published 3 years after Bonatti's death)
Denis Ducroz - Naufragés au Mont-Blanc (2011 - sur TVMountain)
J.R. Belliard and R.Romet (ex helicopter pilot rescuer and preeident of the International helicopter pilots association). Secours extrême, Flammarion 1986.
Testimonials and contributors
Mick Fowler and Victor Saunders, famed British alpinists learned to know each other while winterclimbing in Scotland, in all kind of weather, mostly bad: an ideal stepping stone for great Himalayan adventures. They shared three expeditions in Pakistan: The ascents of Bojohagur (7329m), Spantik (7027m) and Ultar (7388m) and one in India 29 years later: Sersank (6050m).
See more about the book on Summitpost and Sersank first ascent video