if Eric gave this topic the care it deserves, he would have realized that:

A. There was no storm when we stayed on the summit, as has been stated before. What?! No storm?! Oh the details! Here they are! There were only high and localized winds that made descending our chosen route dangerous. In light of the context of good weather where we were, a clear night, and a emergency escape route (what?! really?! I guess nothing went 'wrong' to 'trap' us up there then?!), we felt that we could wait until other safer options became viable. These winds were not forecasted and not predictable under the conditions that we ascended the mountain.

B. I called SAR for Tom, not for me. Eric seems to forget about Tom here. So blinded by the earlier false reports . . . all I can do about that after an attempt to correct them is to pity people who are so easily misled by such a by and large immoral and incompetent industry (which I say based on my ample experience with them in my two unfortunate experiences).

C. There was no storm forecasted when we left Thursday. (somehow I feel like a record here, but he seems to ignore this FACT and seems to prefer the rumor mill of the media reports). AT THE TIME WE LEFT, there was a small chance of mild weather developing late Sunday through Monday. Yes, the weather did break on us, but only after we stayed on the summit past our planned latest descent time as a result of Tom suddenly developing HACE.

D. Claiming that my failure to descend when conditions were deteriorating as a mistake is EXTREMELY judgmental, since at that time I had to choose between staying with Tom at risk to myself, or leaving him to die alone while maximizing my safety. Calling this a mistake, which Eric has done in his loose judgments in generalizing events, is incredibly sloppy for such a serious decision. Or perhaps in a similar circumstance Eric would leave his partner to die. Good for you, Eric, but I have different moral considerations than you and maybe you should consider that decision to be my business.

E. I haven't said everything publicly, there is more to be said that casts a much different light on the circumstances, and that I will be publishing a more full account on SP and please show tact and restraint and wait until all of the cards are out before casting your judgment - since that is what some of you do - Eric, you like to judge. Well, I prefer to learn, understand, and grow from experiences.

F. Eric is talking fast and loose about a very serious and tragic subject, with seemingly no concern beyond his own power trip. Let's just hope for his sake that Karma doesn't exist.

About the only theme that I see coming from Eric is either "don't climb mountains" or "don't climb mountains in winter", both of which reduce risk by completely removing a hazard. Yet the point of my article was to say why I originally chose not to do so, and why after the tragedy, I've decided to continue attempting to mitigate the hazard rather than running from it. He could have just as easily said that his tolerance for acceptable risk is not the same as mine, that we have differing ideas on what is a responsible way to deal with it and left it at that.

Actually, here I'll amuse myself real fast, since I just can't resist and it's so easy.

Eric's earlier claims of my mistakes, which he made without asking any questions or giving his declarations much thought:

1) You chose to be high on the mountain as darkness fell. (Is this really true!)

I often choose to be high on the mountain in the dark. Darkness is often a safer time to climb mountains as the snow is more consolidated and the weather is more stable. Many mountaineering routes require starting or ending in darkness. And remember that we 'chose', we did not accidentally end up that way. You're applying a pretty uninformed and simplistic standard here. And technically, darkness never really fell. The clear skies and full moon kept things nice and bright.

2) You chose a more difficult route with a more difficult decent.

How is choosing anything but the easiest route to the summit a mistake? We have an extremely judgemental peakbagger here. And a more difficult descent? That's news to me, since the planned descent routes were rated easier than the Whitney Glacier and are the standard descent routes on that side of the mountain.

3) You chose to camp near the summit above 14,000 feet without proper acclimatization.

Funny, we didn't camp, and we were properly acclimatized by all reasonable standards and observations. Camping implies premeditated intent to stay there. We bivvied, which implies an unplanned night out - or is the distinction too hard for you to tell apart?

4) You chose to continue to the summit when the weather was turning bad.

Actually, no, the weather was getting better where we were and could see when we continued to the summit. The plateau was completely calm of winds. The weather forecasts from Thursday had also called for that night to be clear.

5) You had inexperience with the type of weather a volcanic peak on the west coast can create and the warning signs of dangerous weather.

Funny - I grew up in Salt Lake City, far closer to the mountains than you probably did in Washington. And I've lived on the west coast for 8 years now, making it to Shasta in the winter or spring at least once a year. Also, I'm well aware of how weather works on peaks with high prominence. I've taken pains to learn a lot about signs of mountain weather. And I used this experience in climbing Denali, staying in camp on days that ultimately turned out to be stormy.

Tom Bennett grew up in Canada and spent nearly a decade living in Vancouver, BC and climbing in the glaciated volcanic peaks of the PNW. He was the most active in the mountains in the winter and was no stranger to the mountain weather there.

I wonder what Eric bases this 'inexperience' on apart from the fact that we had to change our plans in light of highly localized 'bad' weather. And no, the weather was not turning bad when we chose to stay on the summit, nor during the night, nor during the first half of the following day.

6) You were lacking the proper gear for intense weather. Placing wands to the summit would have given you the confidence to descend during a storm instead of trying to wait out the storm, a typical death sentence on these peaks. Storms last for days, you can't afford to "hang out" at the summit. Wands are an essential piece of gear that few climbers outside the northwest realize.

Um, we were lacking proper gear for 100 mph winds and rime that buried the area up to several feet thick? Even at 10,000 ft, the rime was so hard on my Bibler I-Tent that it collapsed catastrophically, blasting the poles out of the tent and launching them several feet away. Do tell, what is this magical gear that you say we should have carried?

Placing wands for our descent? Umm, we climbed through technical icefalls and one concern was rappelling back through them. Wands don't help there, especially since our concern in retracing the route was suffering a crevasse fall by passing through shaded areas that could hide buried crevasses. And wands are only good for short stretches. The areas where navigation could be a problem was stretched over several miles long and we had no plans to return that way - the glacier is usually not reversed. Instead, the Bolam Glacier or the Bolam-Whitney Ridge is the standard descent route. I've used wands, know when they're appropriate, and they weren't appropriate in this case.

And waiting out a storm? Where did you get that from? I never said that in the context you claim, and I've never been quoted as saying that. Do tell.

The only time I said anything like that was in regards to whether I should stay with Tom's body or not, in light of what had last been reported as a low chance of occasional mild weather with little wind and negligible precip and in light of the complications that could be caused by leaving the scene after calling a SAR. Weather had begun to deteriorate when I was caring for Tom, so I stayed on regardless of the conditions because of that. Once I got the message saying that the weather forecast had changed, I tried to find out about the weather to see if it were the sort of storm I should run from, since not all storms are the "mega" storms that you speak of. When I couldn't ascertain this, I chose to leave, so technically I chose to flee in the face of the incoming weather, and not "wait it out". The only storm that was on the peak was the one that started brewing AFTER Tom got HACE and rolled through AFTER Tom died.

Get your timelines straight.

Get your facts straight.

These series of questions illustrate to me how careless and sloppily you've considered the situation. In total, you've made your judgement of the accident based solely on the fact that an accident happened.

SPers, don't waste your time on this guy.

I've been trying to stay out of this, but this is my backyard and where I live, play, and work. I am the owner of Shasta Mountain Guides and this is my 16th season on this Cascade volcano. I was part of the SAR effort when Tom was stranded on the mountain, and also made a summit climb on the day they ultimately chose to bivy near the top.

For me to justify why I climb and choose to put myself in potentially risky situations, I have to beieve that these incidents are preventable. I want to know that my skills and judgement will preclude me from being in a situation like this.

I have lost count of the number of rescues I have been a part of up here. From fatalities to serious injuries. Every single one of them is preventable. Including this one. Although I don't always agree with Chief's style, I think he and I may have a lot in common. I've seen too many bumbling neophytes, as well as over confidant seasoned alpinists, get themselves into trouble up here. "It's only Shasta" is something I hear far too often. I've been lost, rode avalanches, and nearly died on a simple day hike when an unforecasted storm rolled in; all in a place I have a lot of experience in. Point is, my belief is that survival comes from humility, something I haven't seen much of in this incident.

No finger pointing, no blame, not questioning decisions made. I feel the best lessons learned are from incidents like these, we all need to reason objectively and take away these sometimes harsh realities. We all experience our "age of discovery", that is what drives many of us, myself included. But we need to do so with a sense of style and grace (and self preservation).

My best friend and partner was killed in the mountains, something that has effected every decision I make when traveling in the alpine. Once I realized how fragile the balance of life is, it helps me make conservative, informed choices.

I sympathize with Mark and admire his ability to process this in a public forum. By his doing so, we all have an opportunity to gain some insight into alpine climbing incidents, and form our own opinions around it. However, I do not prescribe to the "shit happens" model. I personally want more control over my destiny.

Peace.

kevin trieu wrote:

The Chief wrote:

Scott wrote:Acclimatization always helps and is recommended, but going sea level to 10K isn't unusual and problems are pretty rare.

Wanna bet?

78 recorded AMS related helo evacs last season alone from the Whitney Region.

My Client died at 10.2K from the most rapid onset of HAPE on record, 3.7 hours from T/H to being pronounced after I gave him CPR for 1.2 hours on our way to descending back to the P/L.

My point, people these days are not taking the acclimatization protocol serious these days. There are many recorded AMS related SAR evolutions here alone in the Eastern Sierra that are never in the media.

Sea Level to 14+K in less than 24 hours.... c'mon!

This has been my standard schedule for climbing Sierra peaks for the past six years when I was working. Friday night I'd start driving, get to TH around midnight and get an early start Sat to about 10k', Sun summit and drive home.

Using the Whitney area for altitude related cases as sampling for all of the Sierra is flawed. You know that the Whitney area attracts majority of people that doesn't have too much experience in the mountains and altitude.

I'll add that, as you know, everyone who goes down to Peru to climb, rides the bus from sea level to 14,000 ft. and then spends the first night at 10,000 ft. Thousands of tourists who go to Machu Picchu fly from sea level (Lima) to 11,000 ft. (Cusco) and spend the night at that altitude. So going sea level to 10k certainly isn't unusual, and I can't say that I have heard much (if anything) about people having problems (other than normal AMS) in the areas that I mentioned.

PellucidWombat wrote:If I don't go straight up from sea level, I almost always start my climbs by sleeping at ca. 10,000 ft, and found 12,000 ft to be my limit for a good night sleep for my first night up at altitude.

This practice does not allow for anyone's body time to acclimate properly, regardless how they "feel".

I live at 7200' and I will not go any higher than 12K my first night, never. In most if not all cases, I go no higher than 10K for my first night. Prior to my moving up here permanently, I would never go any higher than 4-5K the first night and then no higher than 8K the 2nd. I learned my lesson 20 some years ago when I went high too fast and came down with some severe AMS symptoms and started to cough up a red froth uncontrollably. All this at 9K on my 2nd eve.

My client that died of HAPE at 10,200', felt fine, showed absolutely no signs of AMS or HAPE, all the way up to 45 minutes prior to his total collapse and eventual death after collapsing.

I have been with far too many folks that do as you do, and end up going down within 12 hours or sooner, due to their body not adjusting properly. Each time they would tell me that they thought they'd be fine moving up to altitude quickly if they drank and ate properly. Another total falsehood in my book.

Each persons make-up is completely different. Going to altitude at a faster than normal pace, regardless of the amount of times one has done so, I believe, sets one up for a potentially dangerous incident, each different time.

Taking "calculated" risks with this particular situation, is not a smart choice, IMO. Unfortunately, it is a prevailing one these days, as some have openly shared on this thread.

SMG pretty much nailed it on the head with his perception of today's general cocky attitude about going up into them hills.

"I have lost count of the number of rescues I have been a part of up here. From fatalities to serious injuries. Every single one of them is preventable. Including this one. Although I don't always agree with Chief's style, I think he and I may have a lot in common. I've seen too many bumbling neophytes, as well as over confidant seasoned alpinists, get themselves into trouble up here. "It's only Shasta" is something I hear far too often. I've been lost, rode avalanches, and nearly died on a simple day hike when an unforecasted storm rolled in; all in a place I have a lot of experience in. Point is, my belief is that survival comes from humility, something I haven't seen much of in this incident."

All I can say, is think safety first and then move ahead with this aspect as priority in any and all endeavors one does in them high hills.

SMG, great response. Yes, we should learn from the experience and that means a certain degree of judgment, but humility on ALL our parts is essential. I think if this was in real life we'd buy Mark a beer and thank him for sharing his story. While people might question decision A or B, any climber could be in his shoes one day. Perhaps it really takes face to face to realize that.

I just wanted to go back a minute to the idea of discussion "at the same table." Once I deleted a report I wrote because of a comment on it that offered withering criticism, dripping sarcasm, and brought up the idea of dying on a climb and my two kids at home. I don't remember all the details, but I might have asked the commenter to be less ugly, or at least less personal. However, he felt justified in his comment, and ultimately the only choice I could live with was to remove the report. I can definitely say that my own desire to share thoughts and experiences about climbing exist because I feel summitpost is a community that cares, if only a little bit. Amp up the "free for all/wild and wolly internet" attitude and people are going to clam up (if they have any sense).

Privacy, humility and discretion are not valued by the young...they never made any mistakes. I think that growth and redemption only come in periods of quiet reflection on what has happened. Just do the work, don't feed the trolls.

SMG wrote:

But we need to do so with a sense of style and grace (and self preservation).

I give Eric credit for conceding that he didn't start out with style and grace but rather that he delivered a "targeted attack on Mark." So that issue should be behind us. After picking up some hints on English grammar, learning that there was such a thing as "golden powder", and that sometime in the future we might see a Palin/Chief debate, it seems that this thread has finally emerged with a focus: proper acclimatization. The discourse is on.

I understand the viewpoints shared by SMG and the Chief, and I understand the need to properly acclimate. But with respect to HACE, if the incidence rate is around 1%, then aren’t we talking about trying to reduce this risk from 1% down to something between 0% and 1%? If so, it seems that Mark and Tom took steps to reduce this risk -- maybe not to the levels that SMG/Chief would ascribe to, but they didn’t just blindly march from sea level with a plan to sleep on the summit. SMG notes that the incident was “preventable,” presumably by taking even more time to acclimate. That’s just a best guess because Tom could have developed HACE even if they spent another day acclimating (the risk never drops to zero). I think the better analysis is that the risk of developing HACE could, perhaps, have been lowered slightly by additional acclimation. It then becomes a question of acceptable risk.

I looked up the stats for Everest -- found that roughly 2% of all people who attempt the climb die trying (that stat may be right/wrong -- I didn’t have the time to cross-check). That’s twice the rate of developing HACE (and not all HACE victims die). My point is that we all accept some risks when we venture into the mountains. SMG/Chief are right in stating that we should try to minimize risk if possible. But I don’t think we are compelled to try and reduce these risks to their lowest level (if we were, then stayting home is the ultimate safety procedure). Given the details of Mark’s/Tom’s climb, the risk of developing HACE was reduced and pretty low -- and well within many people’s risk tolerance.

For kicks, I looked at the RMI website -- they offer a 4 day Rainier summit climb that involves a day/night in Ashford (1,770 feet), an 8 hour training day above Paradise (6,500 ft +/-), a night back at Ashford, Ashford to Camp Muir (10,000) on day three, then an alpine start and an early morning summit on day 4 (14,400+). Ignoring the short time at 6,500 feet, the participants go from 1,770 to 14,400+ feet in the space of 24+/- hours (if I have the timeline right). A HACE/HAPE recipe? Or are they up and down too fast for these problems to occur?

And, yes, sometimes shit just happens.

FortMental wrote:If the point is survival, stay home.

If the point is to see what the fuck this world is about, get the hell outside. Try to stay reasonably safe and make sure to get in a good scare every now and then. That's why it's called an "adventure".

All you old farts with thousands of years of experience feel fit to pass judgement on someone who "didn't do it right" or simply got unlucky. Fuck you all. I won't defend (or criticize) PW's actions because I wasn't there and I don't know shit from shinola, despite the supposed facts, reported, inferred, suggested, rumored, and otherwise guessed at. At least he hung his ass out there with his buddy and could just as easily have come back with a cool story, instead of tragedy.

As if none of us have ever come back with a cool, quasi-epic story instead of being victim to tragic rock-fall, a fatal stumble, a heart attack, an embolism, a lightning strike, a bear attack, collapsing cornice, some psycho with an axe, a falling tree, carbon monoxide, even falling asleep at the wheel getting to a mountain. Alex Lowe got 400 stitches in face from an ice climbing accident. Did anyone call him an asshole? Conrad Anker didn't come back with his best friend after a ski trip; did any of you dickheads question his judgement?

If you can't accept the fact that sometimes "shit happens", then you live with the illusion that your epic genius and profound wilderness intelligence has put you in total and complete control of yourself, your partners, and the mountain. How mystified you'll be when "shit happens" to you!

FortMental is right on with this one.

This attitude some of you have that all accidents are preventable, sure they are, if you stay home. You can try to minimize the risk, but it will NOT be eliminated no matter what you prepare for. If you go out on a regular basis accidents WILL happen, they happen to the best and most experienced climbers. You need to be able to prepare to react to them as best you can, not just prevent them.

Eric and his possie here might think you can foresee every possible event, but it is impossible to do that all of the time. This is all hindsight. If Mark and Tom had done things differently, and something unfortunate happened in those circumstances, you'd certainly be blasting them for that as well.

ericwillhite wrote:I wrote a targeted attack toward Mark.

Correct. That was not constructive. Even when an accident like this happens, there is a constructive way to approach it so folks can still learn. You were just out to criticize, rather than do something productive. Its unfortunate that you felt the need to attack, rather than analyze.

ericwillhite wrote:2) You chose a more difficult route with a more difficult decent.

Quite frankly that point is bullshit. I suppose Eric only climbs the dog routes up mountains.

edit: damnit- I spelled criticize with a 's' and had to edit it before everyone sent Palin out to field dress me.

kozman18 wrote:I understand the viewpoints shared by SMG and the Chief, and I understand the need to properly acclimate. But with respect to HACE, if the incidence rate is around 1%, then aren’t we talking about trying to reduce this risk from 1% down to something between 0% and 1%?

Perfect point. The issue when trying to further reduce the already-small risks is the balance of cost, benefit, and side effects.

Like mammograms at an earlier age result in a minor reduction of already minute risk of breast cancer, but expose women to additional radiation, pain, and stress of unnecessary biopsies. They also cost money, apparently over $50K per year of quality life saved.

Highway improvements (better lane markings, lighting, etc.) save lives through a minor improvement of already small risk of dying in accident, with no negative side effects, apparently over $100K being a price tag for a year of life saved.

Oral cancer screening may or may not reduce a ridiculously small chance of dying of oral cancer, and costs a lot more per year saved.

The list goes forever. Product safety and various preventive medical care things are the best analyzed. It is always clear that if the safety measures can directed to narrowly-defined high risk groups, then the cost-benefit analysis becomes more favorable.

Too few people climb high peaks to develop good reliable effects on efficacy, side effects, and costs. But some guesses can be made. High risk groups may include people with previously documented altitude adjustment issues, but perhaps others too (hematocrit might matter, for example). Side effects would include inability to jump into action when the weather smiles, and temptation to cut corners when the time window is about to run out. Side effects may also include injuries sustained on acclimation trips, or fatigue from doing too much acclimation work. Side effects could also include increased impact on Nature from more people travelling or staying in the fragile higher-altitude environments. And there are clear costs associated with spending more days on the mountain.

My only point it, extended altitude adjustment regimens are neither free nor 100% efficient. And of course it isn't a one-size-fits-all preventive strategy no matter what The Chief says.

Perhaps I've misread the summaries, but it seems that the victim never showed any signs of AMS before. Since "past history of AMS is the most significant risk factor and best predictor," I too would have presumed he had a low risk of succumbing to HACE.

Sh*t happens. The human body isn't 100% predictable. A perfectly healthy individual can have acute appendicitis 2 days into the wilderness, and unless s/he has a satellite transmitter, that's the end. A vigorous individual can be talking to you one moment, then have a hemorrhage through an undiagnosed AVM, lose consciousness in 15 seconds, and be dead in 10 minutes.

It is bizarre that on one thread, folks are arguing that the only fair way to ascend Everest is without supplemental O2; and here we are railing against a thoughtful fellow who took many more precautions in going to 14000'.

FortMental wrote:If the point is survival, stay home.

If the point is to see what the fuck this world is about, get the hell outside. Try to stay reasonably safe and make sure to get in a good scare every now and then. That's why it's called an "adventure".

All you old farts with thousands of years of experience feel fit to pass judgement on someone who "didn't do it right" or simply got unlucky. Fuck you all. I won't defend (or criticize) PW's actions because I wasn't there and I don't know shit from shinola, despite the supposed facts, reported, inferred, suggested, rumored, and otherwise guessed at. At least he hung his ass out there with his buddy and could just as easily have come back with a cool story, instead of tragedy.

As if none of us have ever come back with a cool, quasi-epic story instead of being victim to tragic rock-fall, a fatal stumble, a heart attack, an embolism, a lightning strike, a bear attack, collapsing cornice, some psycho with an axe, a falling tree, carbon monoxide, even falling asleep at the wheel getting to a mountain. Alex Lowe got 400 stitches in face from an ice climbing accident. Did anyone call him an asshole? Conrad Anker didn't come back with his best friend after a ski trip; did any of you dickheads question his judgement?

If you can't accept the fact that sometimes "shit happens", then you live with the illusion that your epic genius and profound wilderness intelligence has put you in total and complete control of yourself, your partners, and the mountain. How mystified you'll be when "shit happens" to you!

I have had too much "Shit Happen" to me and all around me. As has SMG.

It is very apparent that you haven't as you use other's experiences of "shit happening" to them as examples.

Next time you sit beside a fellow dead climber for over six hours, alone, awaiting the Body Bag Haulers to arrive and take them off the hill. Or, the next time you are actually one of those Body Bag Haulers and have to pick up the pieces of what used to be a human being, then you may just understand where some of us are coming from.


Oh yeah Big Balls Fortmental, so far I see that no one on this thread has passed any judgment on anyone other than you...typical.

Oh yeah, there is a bigass difference between confronting unforeseen dangerous situ's, than heading out into any situ and not following preventative measures that could in fact lead one to face a dangerous situ that as SMG noted, could have well been prevented.

FortMental wrote:If the point is survival, stay home.

If the point is to see what the fuck this world is about, get the hell outside. Try to stay reasonably safe and make sure to get in a good scare every now and then. That's why it's called an "adventure".

All you old farts with thousands of years of experience feel fit to pass judgement on someone who "didn't do it right" or simply got unlucky. Fuck you all. I won't defend (or criticize) PW's actions because I wasn't there and I don't know shit from shinola, despite the supposed facts, reported, inferred, suggested, rumored, and otherwise guessed at. At least he hung his ass out there with his buddy and could just as easily have come back with a cool story, instead of tragedy.

As if none of us have ever come back with a cool, quasi-epic story instead of being victim to tragic rock-fall, a fatal stumble, a heart attack, an embolism, a lightning strike, a bear attack, collapsing cornice, some psycho with an axe, a falling tree, carbon monoxide, even falling asleep at the wheel getting to a mountain. Alex Lowe got 400 stitches in face from an ice climbing accident. Did anyone call him an asshole? Conrad Anker didn't come back with his best friend after a ski trip; did any of you dickheads question his judgement?

If you can't accept the fact that sometimes "shit happens", then you live with the illusion that your epic genius and profound wilderness intelligence has put you in total and complete control of yourself, your partners, and the mountain. How mystified you'll be when "shit happens" to you!

Word. I've had epics with Mark, cherish the memories, & look forward to more.

There is a randomness to life that you cannot eradicate, no matter what precautions you take. MOCKBA stated it correctly -- we are constantly weighing risks and rewards. Want to climb Everest? Load your 50 chambered gun with one bullet and squeeze the trigger. Want to climb a 14,000 peak, like Shasta? Take a 1 in 100 shot that you will develop HACE. Want to be safe? Sit on the couch and watch TV (although that has its own risks). You can't eradicate all risk -- only reduce it.

So the argument boils down to whether the risk was acceptable. Mark and Tom had experience, the right gear, a weather window, etc. Could they have acclimated for extra days to reduce the HACE risk? I guess. But the real question is should they -- was it improper to follow the plan that they did? I don’t see why they should be expected to adopt the Chief’s acceptable level of risk (which is personal to him and probably altered by the loss of a client), or that of SMG (which may be different due to his SAR background). Or mine for that matter. I don’t see anything in Mark’s story that indicates they took risks outside of an acceptable range (yeah, that begs the question of what's acceptable -- there will always be gray areas). But the argument can't be that they should have adopted your risk tolerance. That makes no sense.

Shit happens -- reduce the probability of it if you can, but not at all costs. Otherwise, life will be pretty boring.

So all these professional guides are saying that all accidents can be prevented, then I suppose they, or one of there clients, will never be in an accident again in the future. Either that or they would be negligent in not preventing it, since they could have.

Good to know.