I think the military aircraft industries have to take this attitude, just to jar people into being careful. My company was once controlled largely by ex-navy, and I would say they suffered from a lack of proportion; while they were nit-picking small stuff, their brethren were shooting down unarmed commercial Iranian aircraft, flying jets into the ground or the carrier deck, and so forth.

Nevada has well over 200 wrecks of military craft spread through the deserts and mountains. It is interesting to read the causal analyses. Some are obvious; the pilot spent the night partying at a casino, and got no sleep. A lot are forever mysterious; why did an experienced pilot fly into a mountainside at 400 knots? A lot were with early F16s, and the pilot "lost control" -- not surprising for a plane that was inherently unstable and depended on good sensors and computer systems to keep in control. There were several losses just due to pilots needing to use the piddle pack, and thus neglecting the controls for just a few seconds.

The point is, it is fine to say all accidents are preventable, but if you can't say how, or evaluate the costs involved, it is not a really helpful comment.

Dingus Milktoast wrote:

mrchad9 wrote:So all these professional guides are saying that all accidents can be prevented, then I suppose they, or one of there clients, will never be in an accident again in the future.

Why would you suppose that? No one said or implied that all accidents ARE PREVENTED. Just that they are preventable. Its a mind set and an attitude - not a magic bullet.

DMT

I presume that if the guides believe they can ALL be prevented, then they, with their experience, would prevent them. They wouldn't be involved in any themselves.

Just saying they cannot ALL be prevented, unless you can see into the future. I can't. There is always a chance that something bad will happen, no matter what you do.

Let me note that no where in any of my posts here, have I nor did I indicate them directly at Mark nor Tom in this specific incident.

My point/opinion on this thread, is on a general across the board level. All based on my personal experiences within the past five years or so. We do not even want to go back some 30 years plus, when I began my professional involvement within the SAR community. That will shed a much brighter light than many here will even begin to understand or want to take in. Trust me.

My job as a Professional Guide, is to ensure the safety of any client put under my charge, first and fore most. Putting them into any preventable and dangerous situ that may result in their potential injury or death, is not acceptable nor should it ever be.

The Chief wrote:Oh yeah, there is a bigass difference between confronting unforeseen dangerous situ's, than heading out into any situ and not following preventative measures that could in fact lead one to face a dangerous situ that as SMG noted, could have well been prevented.

The Chief wrote:My Client died at 10.2K from the most rapid onset of HAPE on record, 3.7 hours from T/H to being pronounced after I gave him CPR for 1.2 hours on our way to descending back to the P/L.

My point, people these days are not taking the acclimatization protocol serious these days. There are many recorded AMS related SAR evolutions here alone in the Eastern Sierra that are never in the media.

Sea Level to 14+K in less than 24 hours.... c'mon!

Did you take preventive measures to avoid the tragic situation with your client? If all preventive measures were taken, why is he dead? Or is this a case of "shit happens"?

RE: SMG's comment and "Shit happens",

also e.g. DMT's "The commercial and military aviation industries (as well as a host of other potentially dangerous businesses) DO operate under the assumption that all accidents are preventable.

"Shit happens" is not good enough, when it comes to 300 people sitting in chairs in the sky. Its not good enough for off shore oil rigs either. "

This is the reason I'm talking about this publicly, as I won't just take the "shit happens" mantra with no desire to ponder, discuss, and question what happened or any implications from the tragedy.

There is an "shit happens" explanation in those areas (as I've learned from Prof. Bob Bea at UC Berkeley, who has ample experience in these matters), and that is the case of "unknown unknowables", but one aim of discussing ALL accidents is to see if it certain details really were unknowable. Also, even if certain details were unknowable, lessons can still be learned in an attempt to prevent recurrences reactively.

So far, when talking with those who are informed of all of the details, everyone has been at a loss as to any obvious mistakes that were made that could have prevented the accident, leaving the lesson so far as a "shit happens." (and by obvious, I also mean 'mistakes' that were reasonable to avoid in foresight).

Tom's HACE was the critical even here, and the only ways I can think of that it would have been prevented with foresight (and NOT hindsight) was:

A. Knowing Tom's susceptibility to HACE, assume it was not safe to stay that high with our ascent rate based on his 'pre-existing condition' and decide that descending a route in less ideal circumstances is the safer option

B. Knowing Tom's susceptibility to HACE, walk around throughout the night, making perhaps some more subtle signs of HACE (e.g. ataxia) more apparent in their early stages.

Based on Tom's history and performance at altitude, and the fact that he had had no 'near-misses' to indicate such a vulnerability to HACE, that's where I'd say that this accident technically was preventable but on a practical level, things just happen. Because the critical point here (to me at least) is that Tom had as of then no warnings as to any susceptibility to developing HACE, and the general danger of HACE at that altitude was low enough that many other risk considerations took priority.

Perhaps one lesson learned for prevention of a future occurrence is just realizing how little indication one may have of their susceptibility to developing things like HACE or HAPE, even at moderately high altitudes and despite lack of AMS symptoms. However, the feedback I got when looking into this is just that Tom's particular case was extraordinarily unusual.

At this point with what I know, IMHO, the accident was preventable if his possible condition was a known knowable, when it turns out it was either an unknown knowable, or, far more likely, an unknown unknowable, since there were never any definitive conclusions as to why his HACE came on as it did.

Seems to me its is about our different risk tolerances. Mark takes more risks, that's his prerogative. Now that I am responsible for a wife and kids I've cut my acceptable risks in half. If I can't control my destiny on the mountain, I won't do it. That's just me. It wasn't always that way and this type of climbing probably repulses Mark.

For me, HACE isn't so unpredictable. I am a serious candidate for HACE. I do not acclimate well. I have never done well sleeping at high altitude. Climbing high and sleeping low is my mantra for my own safety. I've tried sleeping on Mt. Rainier at 12,000 and on the summit. I can't do it. I wake up with no air in my lungs! It's quite scary. Maybe if I spent a week on the mountain, I could achieve it. I took 10 days on Denali to reach the 14,000 foot camp and I still felt like crap when I arrived. The 17,200 camp felt worse...after a week at 14K. Camping at 19,500 on Aconcagua was an awful night. But I accepted the risks and had I got HACE, I wouldn't have claimed it a freak accident. Had Marks climbing partner ever camped that high? How much experience did he have with his body at high altitude? Is it not reasonable to suggest there was a risk there. I consider it a risk any time someone camps/bivys that high, especially after high exertion. Exertion, you eating and drinking....all big factors in how your body reacts above 12,000 feet. I have driven up 2 Colorado 14ers, hiked trails up easy ones as well as Mt. Whitney. These require little exertion so I felt just fine on top...but I still wouldn't camp there. I just know my body....from experience. So I just don't subscribe to the theory we did everything right. No you took a risk, and lost, under my rules of climb high, sleep low. Marks climbing team didn't have this rule. I would claim based on lack of experience at high altitude and knowing how their body's could react.

As for no storm on the summit, just high winds. My first two winter attempts at Mt. Rainier were thwarted by high winds on perfect blue sky days. Even you pictures so how fierce the winds were high on the mountain. You took huge risk climbing a route with the intention of down climbing a different route. That is standard mountaineering 101. Again, there is nothing wrong with doing this, just don't act so shocked when you reach the other side to find the conditions are totally different than what you came up.

Also, your reliance on the weather forecasters seems as bad as my reliance on the media reports. You can't put your trust in those things. The big storm that restricted rescuers from reaching your friends body could have come a day early. Then you still would have been stranded on the summit for a few days, possibly calling 911 for help. It happens every year on cascade volcanos. Any decision to camp up there places you at the mercy of mother nature.....not the weather mans predictions. Don't you see the pattern here. Most climbers would not find them selves in the positions you place yourself. You have had Search and Rescue called on you twice. Climbers of previous generations would bow their head in shame. You seem to hold it as a badge of honor.

I don't believe much in coincidence, so let me make a final inflammatory remark. When the next "shit happens" to PellucidWombat, will he admit (if alive) that he has some judgment problems?

Catamount wrote:I hope Chief does blow a gasket over this question, but every time I see him bring up the incident with his client, I find myself asking what would prevent a "professional guide" from carrying a portable defibrillator in a warm weather guiding situation. No they're not cheap, but they're also not heavy and can certainly save lives in backcountry situations. Guides work with folks of all fitness levels and it only stands to reason that there will be occasional heart problems. Don't know if it would have worked in that particular situation ...

In my line of work, I always have one handy.

Good question.

Unfortunately, with this particular HAPE incident, or any other involving HAPE, it would have served absolutely no good as his lungs were completely filled with liquid when I initiated Pulmonary Resuscitation as he did have a faint HB. After a minute of initiating PR, I no longer felt any signs of a HB and then engaged in full on CPR.

We discussed this option during the ensuing investigation and it is actually in the consideration/planning stages.

And Kevin Trieu, as soon as myself and my fellow guide observed the initial and obvious AMS symptoms indicating a potential onset of HAPE, I immediately turned him and myself around, began the process of descending quickly and took measures of returning to the P/L in order to him down to LP immediately. Unfortunately, his HAPE had progressed at such a high rate, that time was not on his side.

ericwillhite wrote:Seems to me its is about our different risk tolerances. Mark takes more risks, that's his prerogative. Now that I am responsible for a wife and kids I've cut my acceptable risks in half. If I can't control my destiny on the mountain, I won't do it. That's just me. It wasn't always that way and this type of climbing probably repulses Mark.

For me, HACE isn't so unpredictable. I am a serious candidate for HACE. I do not acclimate well. I have never done well sleeping at high altitude. Climbing high and sleeping low is my mantra for my own safety. I've tried sleeping on Mt. Rainier at 12,000 and on the summit. I can't do it. I wake up with no air in my lungs! It's quite scary. Maybe if I spent a week on the mountain, I could achieve it. I took 10 days on Denali to reach the 14,000 foot camp and I still felt like crap when I arrived. The 17,200 camp felt worse...after a week at 14K. Camping at 19,500 on Aconcagua was an awful night. But I accepted the risks and had I got HACE, I wouldn't have claimed it a freak accident. Had Marks climbing partner ever camped that high? How much experience did he have with his body at high altitude? Is it not reasonable to suggest there was a risk there. I consider it a risk any time someone camps/bivys that high, especially after high exertion. Exertion, you eating and drinking....all big factors in how your body reacts above 12,000 feet. I have driven up 2 Colorado 14ers, hiked trails up easy ones as well as Mt. Whitney. These require little exertion so I felt just fine on top...but I still wouldn't camp there. I just know my body....from experience. So I just don't subscribe to the theory we did everything right. No you took a risk, and lost, under my rules of climb high, sleep low. Marks climbing team didn't have this rule. I would claim based on lack of experience at high altitude and knowing how their body's could react.

As for no storm on the summit, just high winds. My first two winter attempts at Mt. Rainier were thwarted by high winds on perfect blue sky days. Even you pictures so how fierce the winds were high on the mountain. You took huge risk climbing a route with the intention of down climbing a different route. That is standard mountaineering 101. Again, there is nothing wrong with doing this, just don't act so shocked when you reach the other side to find the conditions are totally different than what you came up.

Also, your reliance on the weather forecasters seems as bad as my reliance on the media reports. You can't put your trust in those things. The big storm that restricted rescuers from reaching your friends body could have come a day early. Then you still would have been stranded on the summit for a few days, possibly calling 911 for help. It happens every year on cascade volcanos. Any decision to camp up there places you at the mercy of mother nature.....not the weather mans predictions. Don't you see the pattern here. Most climbers would not find them selves in the positions you place yourself. You have had Search and Rescue called on you twice. Climbers of previous generations would bow their head in shame. You seem to hold it as a badge of honor.

I don't believe much in coincidence, so let me make a final inflammatory remark. When the next "shit happens" to PellucidWombat, will he admit (if alive) that he has some judgment problems?

I am not repulsed by your level of climbing. I'm repulsed by you (in my opinion) being misleading or overly confident in how you cast your experience and the fact that though you've lowered your risk based on personal circumstances (which I see as completely appropriate), you seem to have problems with judging those who haven't lowered their level of risk to your level.

And just for the record, I have a lot of knowledge and experience in mountaineering and relevant topics to it, but I am not an expert nor do I claim to be. Most of us aren't true experts, and IMHO, you aren't, though you claim to be.

You seem to have issues 'projecting' onto others.

And the winds you refer to - if you're experienced in the mountains in the winter, then you should understand this: loose snow blows around at low wind speeds, and significant snow can be deposited in winds as low as 15 mph, hence the benchmark for when to assume wind slabs were forming (a reason we chose to avoid descending the Bolam Glacier even though it may have been shielded by the winds, it was probably developing wind slabs). Once again, if you read things more closely, I had an anemometer on me and because it was hard to judge the wind speed in the blowing snow and how we should interpret it, I used it, recording wind speeds on the order of 20-30mph.

I have said in several locations (one is in print now, and others are going to be online soon) the way I use weather forecasts, which is a starting point for my weather observations, which I then believe (or not) based on how far out the forecast is, and the weather that I observe on the mountains. So once again, this illustrates your 'faults' of your inability to properly consider the details and your bad habit of making gross assumptions without researching them first.

Make sure you fully know what you're talking about before you judge, lest you dig your hole any deeper.

The Chief wrote:

Catamount wrote:And Kevin Trieu, as soon as myself and my fellow guide observed the initial and obvious AMS symptoms indicating a potential onset of HAPE, I immediately turned him and myself around, began the process of descending quickly and took measures of returning to the P/L in order to him down to LP immediately. Unfortunately, his HAPE had progressed at such a high rate, that time was not on his side.

Hey Chief, guess what? This sounds just like my case, except that Tom's first warning signs were losing vision and balance. And guess what I did IMMEDIATELY after these signs? I did not call 911 and wait for a rescue - I attempted to get him DOWN first. I only called 911 once I realized that this was impossible.

One of the "shit happens" factors on Shasta was that Tom's first warning signs were ones that made it impossible to evacuate him.

I must add this tid bit of info which I assume that Damien and SMG will agree with.

Some clients ARE NOT FORTHRIGHT on their Trip Applications and do not document all their vital medical history within the App.

If they do not inform the Service of all their current, recent and past potentially dangerous medical history, the Service can not appropriately respond to any unknown nor unforeseen issues when they arise. Unfortunately, this was partially the case in my incident along with some others that I have experienced. Fortunately, the rest worked out in the end when we took the appropriate measures/actions to alleviate any further issues from arising which would have certainly resulted in far worse results.

The Chief wrote:I must add this tid bit of info which I assume that Damien and SMG will agree with.

Some clients ARE NOT FORTHRIGHT on their Trip Applications and do not document all their vital medical history within the App.

If they do not inform the Service of all their current, recent and past potentially dangerous medical history, the Service can not respond to any unknown nor unforeseen issues when they arise. Unfortunately, this was partially the case in my incident along with some others that I have experienced. Fortunately, the rest worked out in the end when we took the appropriate measures/actions to alleviate any further issues from arising which would have certainly resulted in far worse results.

Definitely a problem and a valid question people had as far as wondering if Tom wasn't adequately and truthfully reporting his history or how he felt.

Though I don't have hard evidence, his attitude in disclosing information and the signs that I saw of him feeling fine make me doubt that he was actively covering anything up, but he may have had more subtle internal symptoms that he didn't connect with AMS. Of course, this is just an opinion.

PellucidWombat wrote:Hey Chief, guess what? This sounds just like my case, except that Tom's first warning signs were losing vision and balance. And guess what I did IMMEDIATELY after these signs? I did not call 911 and wait for a rescue - I attempted to get him DOWN first. I only called 911 once I realized that this was impossible.

One of the "shit happens" factors on Shasta was that Tom's first warning signs were ones that made it impossible to evacuate him.

I am certain that you in fact did what you could.

Never say anything is impossible when it comes to retreat in order to survive.

Joe Simpson proved that.

I asked a friend -- a retired paramedic -- what can be done about pulmonary edema. The first answer is "get the person to a hospital." The second was to tourniquet each limb to prevent too much fluid going back to the lungs. I have no idea if this is even prescribed any more, but it sure seems beyond the pale of what most people are taught. The third answer is to administer prescription vasodilators and diuretics. I just don't think the average guiding agency can have all this stuff, unless there is an MD or at least a PA on every trip.

The Chief wrote:

PellucidWombat wrote:Hey Chief, guess what? This sounds just like my case, except that Tom's first warning signs were losing vision and balance. And guess what I did IMMEDIATELY after these signs? I did not call 911 and wait for a rescue - I attempted to get him DOWN first. I only called 911 once I realized that this was impossible.

One of the "shit happens" factors on Shasta was that Tom's first warning signs were ones that made it impossible to evacuate him.

I am certain that you in fact did what you could.

Never say anything is impossible when it comes to retreat in order to survive.

Joe Simpson proved that.

One problem here was a decision that I made that (in hindsight) may have not been the best one, but there's no way to say. That decision was that I could not get Tom down a safe route in his condition, and that the safest option was to call for assistance. e.g. in Tom's condition, one response I could have done would be to assist/drag him over the sub-summit and attempt to lower him straight down to the Whitney Glacier on our ropes, at great risk to both of us.

At the time I had no idea that Tom's HACE would progress to death within 7 hours or else I would have done much more to get him down despite the risk.

I have to admit that SEVEN HOURS is a lengthy amount of time when it comes to getting someone off the hill.

I only wish that I had SEVEN HOURS with Jack. I would have most certainly gotten him down to LP Hospital, no more than a total of 3 hours from the location where he had collapsed. They may have administered the proper actions that could have saved his life.